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MUNICIPALITIES from the Central Valley in California to Up-state New York bear the legacy of reckless mortgage lending.Foreclosed homes and toxic titles1 have caused blight and cost
communities billions of dollars. Many cities2 tried to halt the risky loans
by calling on state and federal legislators and regulators to intervene.
Some even passed ordinances aimed at curtailing the high-cost loans that
were destroying their neighborhoods. Their pleas were dismissed and
their ordinances overturned. The resulting subprime crisis played a cen-
tral role in the great financial crisis that began in 2008. Millions of people
lost their jobs and, as a consequence, lost their homes too. Municipalities
have born the burden of empty, dilapidated homes that pepper once vi-
brant neighborhoods. A handful of cities have sued financial institutions,
attempting to recover their losses. The lawsuits have been complex and
expensive, and limits on municipal standing have dramatically restricted
the relief cities can recover.
The City of Cleveland’s (the City) experience demonstrates the chal-
lenge municipalities faced when predatory lenders moved into town.
Mortgage brokers and lenders began targeting Cleveland and its inner-
ring suburbs with predatory loans3 in the 1990’s. The Cleveland City
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1. Titles become toxic when shoddy—and sometimes fraudulent—paperwork during
the securitization process clouds the chain of title to the property.
2. Throughout this Article, I use the terms municipalities, cities, towns, and localities
interchangeably.
3. In its most simple form, a predatory loan is a loan that a borrower will not be able
to repay. Other predatory terms include charging people higher interest rates based on
their race, deceiving or defrauding borrowers, hiding key loan terms, and requiring bor-
rowers to waive their right to go to court. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale
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Council responded with an ordinance4 designed to halt the plague that
was infecting the city. The American Financial Services Association,
which represents the credit industry, successfully sued the City and the
ordinance was struck down.5
The City asked federal and state regulators for help that never came.
They went to the state capitol and lobbied for an anti-predatory lending
bill. In 2002, several years after the City’s elected officials told state legis-
lators in Columbus of their problems with predatory lenders, the legisla-
ture passed a law that prohibited cities from regulating lending and
credit.6 The law also established a Predatory Lending Study Committee
to report on predatory lending in mortgage originations.7 The new law
did not place any limits on loan terms or practices. Four years later in
2006, after twelve years of rising foreclosures in Cleveland,8 the state fi-
nally passed a law aimed at addressing abuses in the home mortgage
market.9
A decline in manufacturing jobs had already handicapped the Cleve-
land economy and the housing market. The rash of predatory loans inten-
sified Cleveland’s decline. With entire blocks lined with abandoned,
boarded up homes, the City’s next step was a lawsuit against the financial
institutions that made and financed unaffordable loans.10 The City hoped
of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255,
1260 (2002).
4. CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE part 6, tit. 3, ch. 659, § 659.01, et seq. (2002).
5. Am. Fin. Services Ass’n v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 179 (2006).
6. Id. at 175.
7. See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FISCAL NOTE & LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
124TH GEN. ASSEMB. OF OHIO, http://www.lsc.ohio.gov/fiscal/fiscalnotes/124ga/hb0386en
.htm [https://perma.cc/P43V-KLYX].
8. Frank Ford, Foreclosure and Vacant Property Trends in Cuyahoga County: 1995-
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9. See Bricker and Eckler LLP, Summary of Senate Bill 185, Ohio Home Ownership
Protection Act, MARTINDALE.COM (June 22, 2006), http://www.martindale.com/administra-
tive-law/article__235362.htm [https://perma.cc/M327-9UEZ].
10. See Second Am. Compl., Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 2008 WL 4600486
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2008) (No. 08CV00139).
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it could recover for the damage the banks had caused its neighborhoods
and the city budget.11 A federal district court dismissed the City’s law-
suit,12 which the court of appeals affirmed.13 The blight Cleveland tried to
prevent persists and Cleveland has no recourse.
In this Article, I analyze the legal and regulatory problems municipali-
ties encountered when they attempted to restrict high-risk mortgage
loans. I argue that these problems are the result of a broader, more sys-
temic issue: municipalities are severely limited in their ability to act
against commercial interests that cause harm to their communities. In the
case of risky mortgage lending, I contend that the sensible policy is to
expand localities’ power to protect against actions by financial institutions
that threaten or impose costs on communities. There are, of course, other
important areas where the actions of commercial interests cause harm to
municipalities, such as polluting and selling guns. While it is possible that
these issues might also be better addressed by expanding the power of
localities, my focus is on mortgage lending.
In Part II below, I chronicle the efforts that cities, states, and the fed-
eral government made (or did not make) to rein in abusive lending. I
then review, in Part III, how the three levels of government responded to
the foreclosure crisis. I have separated the three level of governments’  ex
ante and ex post efforts because the tools employed to prevent harm dif-
fer from those used to ameliorate harm. The purpose of Parts II and III is
to describe the ways in which state and federal governments failed to
assist cities and the ways in which the law stymied municipal efforts to
prevent harm and recover for the damages caused by risky home loans.
After demonstrating that cities lack the power to prevent or recover for
risky loans that harm their neighborhoods in Part IV, I provide rationales
for giving localities authority to regulate mortgage lenders. Part V con-
tains models for local regulation of home mortgage lending. I then con-
clude in Part VI.
II. EFFORTS TO HALT ABUSIVE LOANS
A. PREDATORY AND SUBPRIME LENDING
Predatory lending began in the 1990s in areas of the country where
demand for credit was high, consumer protection laws were lax, and po-
11. See id. It goes without saying that financial institutions were not the sole cause of
the mounting foreclosure rates in Cleveland. The point of this Article is to highlight a gap
in governance, not to identify a single culprit behind the foreclosure epidemic. There were
borrowers who knowingly took out risky loans, hoping they could ride the home apprecia-
tion wave. Many investors walked away from loans when the economy began its downward
slide. And as I mention in the text, Cleveland was suffering from a post-industrial down-
turn. Lastly, many of the homes in Cleveland that went into foreclosure were post-World
War II bungalows that did not have the amenities borrowers now seek. All these factors
contributed to the foreclosure rates.
12. Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 536 (N.D. Ohio
2009).
13. Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2010).
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tential borrowers were less sophisticated, often because past discrimina-
tion and credit rationing14 prevented them from gaining experience with
credit transactions. These borrowers frequently, but not always, had lim-
ited credit histories or blemishes on their credit reports.15
In the initial stage, mortgage brokers identified prospects by searching
city hall records to find people with outstanding housing code violations
and by scouring newspapers to find older women who had lost their hus-
bands.16 They then reached out to people by putting flyers on their doors
and calling them during dinner with offers to refinance their existing
loans. The brokers’ loans contained onerous terms like credit life insur-
ance, for which the entire premium was paid at closing out of the loan
proceeds. The points and fees could be astronomical—for example, as
much as $25,000 in points on a $100,000 loan.17 Worst of all, the loans
were usually unaffordable from the start. As soon as borrowers were on
the brink of default, their brokers appeared to refinance the loan, ex-
tracting huge fees, and increasing the principal with each round of refi-
nancing; default and foreclosure inevitable. Deception, intimidation, and
targeting Black and Latino people with the priciest loans when they actu-
ally qualified for less-expensive prime-rate loans were all common
place.18 As a result, many borrowers lost their homes.19
Predatory lenders initially were small, non-depository institutions.
Over time, they grew larger. Soon national banks saw the opportunity to
make high-cost loans.20 The banks entered the market by acquiring sub-
prime lenders or by establishing affiliates to make such loans.21 With
more players in the market, competition increased. And, with more main-
stream institutions in the space, the terms of loans and the practices of
brokers and lenders improved some.22 Even with the somewhat less oner-
ous terms, lenders were making loans that borrowers could not afford
and borrowers were still losing their homes to foreclosure.23
In the section below, I discuss whether and how cities, states, and the
federal government attempted to protect borrowers from abusive loans.
The programs and lawsuits I discuss are representative, not exhaustive.
14. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1271-73 (describing credit rationing in mort-
gage markets).
15. For a full description of the operations of predatory and subprime lenders, see
KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT,
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 21-42 (Oxford University Press 2011).
16. Id. at 21.
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id. at 25, 30.
19. Id. at 121.
20. Id. at 25-6.
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id. at 25-42.
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B. CITY EFFORTS
1. City Ordinances
Several counties and cities, including Cleveland, attempted to use their
home rule authority to curtail predatory lending by passing ordinances
that limited interest rates and prepayment penalties on home loans, and
mandated counseling for borrowers before they could enter into high-cost
mortgage loans.24 The financial services industry trade group responded
with lawsuits seeking to enjoin enforcement of the ordinances on the
grounds that the localities had exceeded their home rule authority.25
Courts consistently outlawed the ordinances. The courts’ decisions were
not surprising given the way judges have interpreted home rule doctrine
in recent years.
The boundaries of cities’ powers are elusive. As one writer stated, “the
most authoritative explication of the contemporary state of the police
power is in McQuillin’s local government treatise,26 which is essentially a
three volume tome of several hundred years of conflicting court
decisions.”27
State legislatures and courts have attempted to delineate the power of
cities within their realm, adopting one of three broadly defined ap-
proaches. The oldest and first construction, known as Dillon’s Rule, dis-
avows home rule.28 In these jurisdictions, municipalities can exercise
powers expressly granted by the state, powers implied by or incident to
the expressly granted powers, and lastly, those powers that are “essential
to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corpo-
ration, not simply convenient but indispensable.”29 A second approach,
known as imperium in imperio home rule, gives localities the authority to
24. Geoffrey Walsh, The Finger in the Dike: State and Local Laws Combat the Foreclo-
sure Tide, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 139, 181-82 (2011). These included Chicago, Cleveland,
Cleveland Heights (OH), Cook County (IL), Dayton, DeKalb County (IL), Detroit, Los
Angeles, New York City, Oakland, Philadelphia, and Toledo. At least two cities, Cleveland
and Philadelphia, have passed ordinances that impose standards like those in the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act on banks that hold city funds. Raymond Brescia & Sonia Steinway,
Scoring the Banks: Building a Behaviorally Informed Community Impact Report Card for
Financial Institutions, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 339, 353-358 (2013).
25. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Services Ass’n v. Toledo, 112 Ohio St. 3d 323 (2006) (overturn-
ing Toledo’s ordinance); Am. Fin. Services Ass’n v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 179
(2006) (overturning Cleveland’s ordinance); Am. Fin. Services Ass’n v. Oakland, 34 Cal.
4th 1239, 1245 (2005) (overturning Oakland’s ordinance); Mayor of New York v. Council
of the City of New York, 4 Misc. 3d 151, 162-63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (overturning New
York City’s ordinance).
26. MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 24:1 et seq. (3d ed.).
27. Stephen Miller, Community Rights and the Municipal Police Power, 55 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 675, 680 (2015).
28. Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV. 737,
739 (1959). For a discussion of the history of home rule, see Paul A. Diller, The City and
the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REv. 1109, 1112-21 (2012); Lynn A. Baker &
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV.
1337, 1340-44 (2009).
29. J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-50 (5th ed. 1911).
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pass ordinances that address local concerns.30 Lastly, there are jurisdic-
tions that have that adopted legislative home rule, under which local gov-
ernments have the same authority as the state, unless the state explicitly
provides that it is the sole authority in specified areas.31
It is the role of the courts to determine whether the actions by a partic-
ular locality are ultra vires.32 Although the three models33 for allocating
power to cities appear fairly well delineated, when challenges to ordi-
nances come before courts, judges often disregard the applicable state
home rule model.34 Instead, they ask whether a particular local regulation
could have extraterritorial effects or would impede statewide uniform-
ity.35 Accordingly, if the reach of an ordinance extends beyond the
boundaries of the local jurisdiction, courts tend to strike down the ordi-
nance on the grounds that it is not “local.” Consistent with this approach,
courts typically hold that ordinances governing land are local in nature.36
If a city requires that homeowners procure permits before installing new
kitchens or imposes fines on those who allow their grass to grow above
six inches, it is hard to see any statewide concerns. These examples are
unequivocally local.
Courts most often embrace the statewide uniformity rationale when it
comes to regulations affecting commerce.37 The argument is that local
regulations should not impose undue burdens on commercial enterprises
and should not interfere with the right to contract. As markets have
moved from the local sphere to statewide, national, and even global are-
nas, courts have struck down almost all local regulations affecting com-
merce.38 It appears that the driving principle in home rule cases has
become protecting commercial enterprises and, for that reason, courts
have enjoined local anti-predatory lending ordinances.
30. Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016 BYU L.
REV. 177, 203 (2016).
31. Id. at 254-5. For an example of a court’s application of legislative home rule, see
Easthampton Savings Bank v. Springfield, 470 Mass. 284, 285 (2014) (preempting a city’s
ordinance mandating arbitration of foreclosure claims).
32. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 28, at 1338.
33. Among the fifty states, four are classified as Dillon Rule jurisdictions, and the
remaining forty-six states are divided equally between legislative and imperio home rule
jurisdictions. Id. at 1374.
34. See, e.g., Stahl, supra note 30, at 186-7 (describing a California Supreme Court
decision that was inconsistent with the contours of the state’s home rule standard).
35. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 28, at 1349, 1352; Stahl, supra note 30, at 208.
36. The reality is, however, that ordinances governing property can have extraterrito-
rial effects; for example, a local prohibition on building low-income housing could force
other communities to address the housing needs of lower-income people. Stahl, supra note
30, at 219.
37. Id. at 208.
38. Id. Professor Stephen R. Miller traces the shifting contours of home rule authority
over time in his article, Community Rights and the Municipal Police Power, supra note 27,
at 682-703; see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (draft at 3) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2689834 [https://perma.cc/J9QB-U8F3]) (arguing that for the purpose of pre-
emption analysis, regulation of energy-related activities should be divided into different
strands (e.g., locating sites for drilling versus financing or development). The job of courts
would then to be to make preemption decisions on each strand.).
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2. Signs of a Move Toward “Progressive Federalism”?39
In recent years, municipalities have mounted new efforts to curtail in-
dustries that are harming their communities. 40 As one reporter de-
scribed, “as the federal government remains gridlocked and some states
fail to act, cities are stepping into the breach.”41 Whether these ordi-
nances will withstand challenges is largely unknown at this point.
Dallas imposed a five-cent tax on plastic bags to help reduce the almost
$4 million a year it was spending on litter removal.42 Seattle, San Fran-
cisco, Miami Beach, Washington, D.C., and other municipalities have
banned styrofoam.43 Lincoln, Nebraska, banned police drones.44 In 2014,
numerous cities passed minimum wage laws that exceed the federal mini-
mum wage.45 Philadelphia Mayor, Jim Kenney, has proposed a tax on
soda to fund citywide pre-kindergarten.46
In a bold move toward greater autonomy, about 150 jurisdictions have
passed “community rights” ordinances, which proclaim they have the
right to self-governance.47 The residents of Grant Township in Penn-
sylvania went even further and adopted an ordinance to legalize nonvio-
lent civil disobedience to protect residents who protested a proposed well
for depositing toxic wastewater from fracking.48
39. Progressive federalism refers to policies that advance progressive causes, such as a
higher minimum wage, at the local level. See Mike Konczal, Why We Need Progressive
Federalism, NATION (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-we-need-pro
gressive-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/4L3C-LY3F].
40. Andrew Ryan, On range of issues, mayors are taking the initiative, BOSTON GLOBE
(June 21, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/06/20/federal-authority-last-cen-
tury-big-city-mayors-are-new-power-centers/yyZlHolrjB8Dbpd6J2Yd1O/story.html.
41. Lydia DePillis, ‘We’ve got ‘em on the run’: Texas cities work to rein in payday loans,
WASH. POST (July 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/14/
weve-got-em-on-the-run-texas-cities-work-to-rein-in-payday-loans/ [https://perma.cc/
KQC6-XFC8].
42. Lisa Falkenberg, For Abbott, government’s the problem unless it’s the solution,
HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/columnists/
falkenberg/article/For-Abbott-government-s-the-problem-unless-it-s-6007001.php [https://
perma.cc/XY9Y-X2LT]. After plastic bag manufacturers and recyclers sued Dallas saying
the City did not have the authority to impose the ban, Dallas repealed the ban. Merrill
Hope, Dallas Trashes the Plastic Bag Ban, BREITBART (June 4, 2015), http://www.breitbart
.com/texas/2015/06/04/dallas-trashes-the-plastic-bag-ban/ [https://perma.cc/N2ND-BSL5].
43. Amy Scott, “Styrofoam” bans expand as plastic falls out of favor, MARKETPLACE
(Jan. 4, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/01/01/world/styrofoam [https://
perma.cc/3VBQ-7BVB]. A court struck down a similar ban in New York City. Benjamin
Mueller, Judge Strikes Down New York City’s Ban on Foam Food Containers, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/nyregion/judge-strikes-down-new-
york-citys-ban-on-foam-food-containers.html [https://perma.cc/7A9S-73WY].
44. Jenni Bergal, Cities Forge Policy Apart From States, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/1/
15/cities-forge-policy-apart-from-states [https://perma.cc/T3VT-CE2Z].
45. Id.
46. Eric Duvall, Clinton, Sanders at odds over Philly soda tax plan, UPI (Apr. 22, 2016,
4:56 PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2016/04/22/Clinton-Sanders-at-odds-over-
Philly-soda-tax-plan/1171461356991 [https://perma.cc/L6SX-C2DX].
47. Miller, supra note 27, at 676.
48. Kate Stringer, Faced With a Fracking Giant, This Small Town Just Legalized Civil
Disobedience, YES MAG. (May 13, 2016), http://www.yesmagazine.org/planet/faced-with-a-
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Increasingly, payday-lending ordinances have sprung up, especially in
Texas where the state places no limits on the amount payday lenders can
charge customers. Cities, including Houston, Dallas, Austin, El Paso, and
San Antonio, elected to adopt their own local payday lending
ordinances.49
The Dallas City Council used its zoning authority to prohibit payday
lenders from operating near highways and in residential areas.50 The ordi-
nance also restricts the location of auto title lenders, who loan cash to
owners of cars and take the borrowers’ car titles as collateral.51 A trade
association of lenders challenged the ordinance, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief on the grounds that state law preempted the Dallas ordi-
nance.52 Because the ordinance allowed imposition of a fine for violators
and was intended to protect the public at large, the trial and appellate
courts found that the statute was penal in nature and, therefore, that civil
courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction.53
In California, cities have banned payday lenders from low-income
neighborhoods, placed limits on the total number of pay-advance stores
in their jurisdictions, and mandated that payday lenders be no closer to
fracking-giant-this-small-town-just-legalized-civil-disobedience-20160513 [https://perma.cc/
4V74-KPXH].
49. Falkenberg, supra note 42. A bill to restrict payday lending failed in the Texas
legislature. DePillis, supra note 41.
50. DePillis, supra note 41.
51. Masako Melissa Hirsch, Opponents keeping up pressure on payday lenders in
Texas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Sept. 28, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/
news/metro/20140927-opponents-keeping-up-pressure-on-payday-lenders-in-texas.ece
[https://perma.cc/N9SP-PRL6]. See also Olivia M. Pena, Municipal Regulation of Payday &
Title Loans in Texas, 17 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 71 (2014) (discussing the various payday
lending ordinances in Texas and the potential challenges lenders might raise). The auto
loan provisions also limit the size of loans based on borrowers’ income or the value of their
cars, restrict loan renewals, and mandate that borrowers make minimum payments. Hirsch,
supra note 51.
52. Hirsch, supra note 51.
53. Consumer Serv. Alliance of Tex. v. Dallas, 433 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2014, no pet.). The appellate court found that “the Ordinance states its primary purpose is
‘to protect the welfare of the citizens of the city of Dallas by monitoring credit access
businesses in an effort to reduce abusive and predatory lending practices.’ As such, it is
clearly addressing a wrong to the public at large.” Id. at 803 (citing Dallas, TEX., CODE
§ 50–144). Unless a party is claiming that an ordinance is “unconstitutional and its enforce-
ment will result in irreparable injury to vested property rights,” the vehicle through which
to contest a penal ordinance is by defending a charge under the ordinance. Id. at 805.
The Court of Appeals rejected the trade association’s equitable argument on the
grounds that the members had not demonstrated that they had a vested property right:
Appellants contend they have property, such as business plans, existing cus-
tomer lists and loan portfolios, forms, websites, and business methods, that
will be affected by the Ordinance. However, they do not argue that the Ordi-
nance forbids them from engaging in the lending business—nor can they,
since the Ordinance on its face only regulates the terms under which appel-
lants may offer their services. Appellants, therefore, cannot establish that the
Ordinance harms their vested property rights, as necessary for the trial court
to have equity jurisdiction to entertain appellants’ suit.
Id. at 807.
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each other than one-quarter of a mile.54 As of my writing of this Article,
the California and Texas ordinances have not been struck down.
Although many of the new local ordinances have not yet worked their
way through the courts, in 2015, the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to consider a case that tangentially involved home rule authority.55 There,
Highland Park, Illinois, passed an ordinance banning assault weapons.
The Illinois State Rifle Association challenged the ordinance and the case
worked its way up to the Supreme Court, which declined to grant certio-
rari.56 We cannot know the Court’s rationale for denying cert, but we can
surmise that the Court concluded that it was not essential for them to
consider the legality of Highland Park’s ordinance.
While there is reason to believe that there is increasing deference to
home rule, many local regulations have generated extensive pushback
from industry and state governments.57 In Texas, several communities
passed ordinances forbidding fracking rigs near homes, schools, and
churches.58 Denton, Texas went further and banned fracking within the
city limits.59 In response to these local efforts, the state legislature passed
a law that prohibited localities from limiting fracking,60 and also stripped
towns of “the power to regulate many other aspects of the industry that
had been commonly regulated, like fracking wastewater disposal.”61
Fracking is not the only topic that has generated discord between cities
54. Tom Gogola, Jennifer Wadsworth & Josh Koehn, Local Lawmakers Forced to
Take on “Predatory Lenders,” SAN JOSE INSIDE.COM (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.sanjosein-
side.com/2014/10/09/local-lawmakers-forced-to-take-on-predatory-lenders/ [https://perma
.cc/9UG5-S5LB]; see also Antonio Olivo, Fairfax to control increasing presence of outfits
offering high-interest loans, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/dc-politics/fairfax-to-control-increasing-presence-of-outfits-offering-high-interest-
loans/2015/11/17/e0c69b10-8d83-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html [https://perma.cc/
NVK9-644L] (discussing a similar ordinance in Fairfax, Virginia).
55. Friedman v. Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
447 (2015).
56. Id. The appeal focused on residents’ Second Amendment rights, not on the munic-
ipality’s home rule authority. There are many reasons why the court may have denied the
writ. It could be that the Court was waiting for a better case to decide the contours of the
Second Amendment.
57. Rick Moran, States Stepping in to Deny Excessive Regulation by Local Govern-
ments, AM. THINKER (May 18, 2015), http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/05/states_
stepping_in_to_deny_excessive_regulation_by_local_governments_.html [https://perma.cc/
FA7G-B233].
58. Falkenberg, supra note 42.
59. Id.
60. Peter Gorman, Home Rule Under Fire, FORT WORTH WKLY (Apr. 8, 2015), http://
www.fwweekly.com/2015/04/08/home-rule-under-fire [https://perma.cc/ZXT5-8FHQ].
61. Wade Goodwyn, New Texas Law Makes Local Fracking Bans Illegal, NPR (May
20, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/20/408156948/new-texas-law-makes-local-fracking-
bans-illegal. The Colorado Supreme Court struck down similar city bans on fracking on the
grounds that they would “render the state’s statutes and regulatory scheme superfluous for
at least a lengthy period, materially impeding Colorado’s interests in efficient development
of oil and gas resources.” David Bailey, Colorado Supreme Court Voids Two City Voter-
Approved Fracking Bans, REUTERS (May 2, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
fracking-colorado-idUSKCN0XT1VA [https://perma.cc/R9U7-UXR7]. For a discussion of
both legislative actions and judicial decisions overturning local fracking ordinances, see
Alex Ritchie, Fracking in Louisiana: The Missing Process/Land Use Distinction in State
Preemption and Opportunities for Local Participation, 76 LA. L. REV. 809 (2016).
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and states. Recently, states have enacted laws preventing cities from regu-
lating the size of sodas, passing minimum wage laws, imposing taxes on
using plastic bags at grocery stores, and requiring paid sick days.62
In sum, it is impossible to know whether there is a trend toward ex-
panded local authority.
3. City Litigation
Sometimes cities can achieve through litigation what they cannot
through ordinances. In reviewing city efforts to combat unfair lending, I
have not uncovered any municipal lawsuits to enjoin predatory lending.
As with home rule, limitations on municipal power likely explain the pau-
city of filings by cities. The biggest hurdle for cities is establishing stand-
ing to sue. Standing is a somewhat abstract doctrine, the terrain of which
frequently shifts. Thus, it is difficult to assess whether cities will have
standing in any given situation.63
There are two bases on which cities can potentially bring claims. The
first is to sue to protect residents. Professor Kathleen Morris refers to
“claims brought to remedy harms sustained by local constituents” as
“constituent cases.”64 In general, cities may not recover damages on be-
half of residents. In contrast, when a city seeks to recover for direct inju-
ries to itself, the claim is based on the city’s proprietary interests.
Professor Morris refers to “claims brought to remedy harms sustained by
the locality itself” as “city cases.”65 Cities suing in their proprietary capac-
ities can recover the same array of remedies that any private party can
recover under the applicable law.
When municipalities bring common law claims in state court, they have
standing to the extent allowed under their state constitutions. If they are
in federal court, they must meet Article III and prudential standing
62. Bergal, supra note 44; Adam Sternbergh, The Ban on Plastic Bags vs. the Ban on
Bag Bans, N.Y. MAG. (July 15, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/plastic-
bag-bans.html [https://perma.cc/RN36-AGK7]; David A. Lieb, States saying ‘no’ to cities
seeking to regulate businesses, CHI. TRIB. (May 17, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/nationworld/ct-businesses-banning-bans-20150517-story.html [https://perma.cc/
5GZY-AJ7E]. A Tempe, Arizona city councilwoman, on her behalf and not as a member
of the city council, filed a lawsuit in response to a state law prohibiting cities from limiting
plastic bags at grocery stores. Lawsuit Filed Against State Bill that Prevents Plastic Bag
Bans, PHOENIX 12 NEWS (Sept. 30, 2105), http://phxux.12news.com/story/news/local/ari-
zona/2015/09/30/lawsuit-filed-against-state-bill-that-prevents-plastic-bag-bans/73098734/
[https://perma.cc/323K-WQ5U].
63. For example, in 2014, the Supreme Court reconfigured the prudential arm of
standing, holding that at least two of the requirements are subsumed under other doc-
trines. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387-388,
1395 (2014). For a discussion of the Lexmark decision, see Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Asso-
ciational Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L. REV. 59, 62 (2014).
64. Kathleen Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012).
65. Id.
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requirements.66
If cities sue under a federal or state statute, the statute may give them
statutory standing, i.e., expressly or impliedly the right to file suit. De-
pending on the language of the statute and the forum, cities may still have
to meet Article III and prudential standing requirements in federal court
or state constitutional standing requirements in state court. The determi-
nation whether a city has standing to bring a claim under a statute ulti-
mately depends on: (1) the language of the statute under which it is suing;
(2) the remedies the city is seeking, e.g. injunctive relief, damages, or civil
penalties; (3) whether the city is seeking remedies for its own injuries or
those of others; and (4) the requirements of Article III in federal court,67
or the relevant state constitution in state court.
Statutory prohibitions on unfair and deceptive acts and practices
(UDAP) would be the most natural vehicles through which cities could
challenge exploitative loans. The laws of all fifty states and the federal
government’s Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) 68 allow recov-
ery for UDAP violations. Unfortunately for cities, UDAP statutes pre-
sent challenges. The first and most obvious is that the FTC Act69 and
most state statutes do not give municipalities the right to bring UDAP
claims. Only seven states allow city or county UDAP claims; eleven
others provide statutory standing to district attorneys to bring criminal
actions under their UDAP laws.70 In addition to these limitations, some
state laws preclude UDAP claims arising out of credit transactions.71
66. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 368-70 (2006) (discussing Article III and pru-
dential standing requirements).
67. In the recent Spokeo v. Robins decision, the Supreme Court held that in a claim
based on a statute, plaintiffs can potentially satisfy the requirement of injury-in-fact under
Article III by demonstrating a tangible harm or a material risk of real harm. 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1549 (2016). Arguably, the Spokeo decision reduces the burden on cities seeking to
establish Article III standing in statutory claims. For a discussion of Spokeo, see Craig
Konnoth and Seth F. Kreimer, Spelling out Spokeo, U.PENN. L.R. ONLINE (forthcoming
2016).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. There are other federal laws that regulate mortgage lending;
however, on their face, these laws do not give standing to municipalities. See Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.; Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act (HOEPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (a subsection of TILA); Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). The Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5331(a), gave the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) the authority to bring claims for unfair, decep-
tive and abusive acts.
70. E.g., 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-4, 201-4.1 and 201-8; see also
Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protec-
tion Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1903, 1906, 1911 (2013) (providing an extensive review
of each state UDAP statute and finding that some of the laws “limit the local public enti-
ties that can bring suit, and/or incorporate procedural safeguards, such as requiring prior
state certification of localities as enforcement agents, prior approval by the state before
filing suit, or prior notification to the state before filing suit.”).
71. Carolyn Carter, Consumer Protection in the States, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CENTER
14 (Feb. 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HPD-W3HZ].
620 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
Even when cities do have statutory standing under state laws, rarely
can they bring claims to protect the interests of their residents. For exam-
ple, Massachusetts has one of the most liberal UDAP laws with a broad
standing provision.72 The statute allows claims “by any person” or “any
person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce,”73 which
includes municipalities; however, complainants can only obtain relief if
they suffer injuries.74 In state statutes that have an injury requirement,
cities must “strain to identify harm to their own interests in order to bring
a suit.”75 And then they often “find their efforts blocked by claims that
the offensive conduct is too remote from the city’s injury and the connec-
tion between the two is too tenuous.”76
California’s UDAP law, codified in the Business and Professions Code,
illustrates a different approach. The law enables cities77 to seek injunctive
relief and civil penalties78 against entities that engage in unfair competi-
tion without any need to prove injury.79 Because California’s Constitution
does not include a standing requirement, it is fairly easy for cities to bring
claims in California state courts under the UDAP statute simply by show-
ing that a lender has engaged in unfair competition.
The California law does not allow cities to sue to recover compensatory
damages on behalf of residents injured by violations of the statute.80 The
likely rationale for this limitation is that if cities could recover damages
on behalf of residents, they would be acting as parens patriae, which is
not permitted in federal court and most state courts.81
There are also local UDAP ordinances. Cleveland has an ordinance
that authorizes the city law director to impose fines on and enjoin those
who engage in “unfair, deceptive or unconscionable consumer trade prac-
tices in the sale, lease, rental or loan, or in the offering for sale, lease,
rental or loan of any consumer goods or services.”82 The term “goods and
services” precludes most claims based on loans secured by real property.
If, however, a mortgage loan were made in connection with the provision
of goods or services, such as a secured loan for home repairs, the Cleve-
land ordinance would apply. The Cleveland ordinance also permits ag-
72. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 93A, § 9. For a history of ch. 93A, the first state UDAP law,
see Katerina S. Callahan, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A, Section 11: The Evolu-
tion of the “Raised Eyebrow” Standard, 36 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 139, 141-63 (2002).
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11.
74. Id.
75. Caruso, supra note 63, at 62.
76. Id.
77. There are specific requirements cities must satisfy under the California statute. For
example, smaller cities may have to obtain consent from the district attorney before filing
suit for injunctive relief. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204.
78. Id. at §§ 17204-17206.
79. Unfair competition is defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Id. at § 17200.
80. The California law does allow cities to recover civil penalties, but any penalties
recovered by cities flow only to governmental entities, not to residents. Id. at § 17206(c).
81. Engel, supra note 66, at 362; Caruso, supra note 63, at 69-70.
82. CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE § 643.02, 643.11(a) (2011).
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grieved parties, including the City, to seek injunctions and to recover
compensatory damages and civil penalties for their own injuries.83 How-
ever, no provision permits the City to obtain damages on behalf of re-
sidents harmed by abusive loans.
Like the situation with the California UDAP statute,84 if the City could
pursue such relief for residents, it would be acting as parens patriae—a
power it does not possess. The one exception to the principle that cities
cannot recover on behalf of their residents is found in New York City,
which has a local consumer protection law that permits the commissioner
of consumer affairs to secure civil penalties, and in some situations, resti-
tution for consumers.85
In sum, UDAP laws provide little hope to cities that seek to stop high-
risk lending because cities rarely have statutory standing under state laws,
and when they do, they may not be able to bring claims because they
cannot satisfy constitutional standing requirements, the statutes do not




Unlike cities, states do have the power to pass laws governing the prac-
tices of lenders and the terms of the loans they make. When community
activists and consumer lawyers brought stories of abusive lending to their
state legislators, some listened and crafted legislation aimed at curtailing
the worst practices. North Carolina was at the vanguard. Other states fol-
lowed North Carolina’s path, and by the time the financial crisis dust set-
tled, over half the states had passed some type of anti-predatory loan
law.86 There were also states that, at least initially, went in the opposite
direction. Ohio and Pennsylvania not only refused to extend protections
to borrowers, but they also passed laws prohibiting municipalities from
enacting ordinances to restrict unfair lending.87 There were many states
that took no action or passed laws that simply restated existing federal
law.
While states have more power than cities, they too can be stymied. In
states where legislators introduced anti-predatory lending laws with
strong provisions, lenders and their lobbyists poured money and argu-
83. Id. at § 643.11(a), (b).
84. Supra note 80.
85. N.Y. CITY, N.Y. CODE § 20-703. Like the Cleveland ordinance, claims under the
New York City law can only arise from “the sale, lease, rental, or loan or in the offering for
sale, lease, rental, or loan of any consumer goods or services, or in the collection of con-
sumer debts.” Id. at § 20-700.
86. I am unaware of any state anti-predatory lending laws that permit cities to bring
claims. Some states also passed laws governing the regulation and licensing of mortgage
brokers.
87. Kimm Tynan, Pennsylvania Welcomes Predatory Lenders: Pennsylvania’s Act 55
Preempts Philadelphia’s Tough Ordinance but Provides Little Protection for Vulnerable
Borrowers, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 837, 873, 893 (2003).
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ments into politicians’ pockets in an attempt to derail the legislation.
They were often successful at watering down the provisions in the laws.88
A number of states were able to resist the lobbying blitz and passed anti-
predatory lending laws with provisions requiring that loans be affordable
and banning some of the most exploitative loan terms in the market, such
as pre-paid credit life insurance. In response, the industry began pressur-
ing federal regulators to exempt nationally chartered thrifts and banks
from having to comply with the new state laws.89
In 1996, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)90 issued two rulings
that preempted state regulation of mortgage loans.91 As a result, thrifts
with federal charters no longer had to comply with state consumer pro-
tection laws governing mortgage loans. Despite these rules, in the 1990s,
the OTS actively investigated thrifts that made abusive loans in violation
of state laws. Things changed at the OTS in 2001 when the George W.
Bush Administration began applying the OTS preemption rules to allow
thrifts to escape state anti-predatory lending laws.92
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which regulates
national banks, worried that national banks would switch to thrift char-
ters to take advantage of the OTS preemption rules. It responded by issu-
ing its own preemption rule.93 As a result, all federally regulated national
banks and thrifts were untouchable. Only state banks and thrifts regu-
lated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (FRB), and nonbank lenders were subject to state
anti-predatory lending laws. In effect, federal regulators trampled the
state anti-predatory lending laws for the country’s largest banks.94
88. Glenn R. Simpson, Lender Lobbying Blitz Abetted Mortgage Mess, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 31, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119906606162358773 [https://perma.cc/
UW22-VQRR].
89. Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us, BUSINESS WEEK (Oct. 20, 2008),
at 36, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2008-10-08/they-warned-us-about-the-mort-
gage-crisis.
90. The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the OTS and its responsibilities were transferred
to the OCC.
91. Office of Thrift Supervision, Lending and Investment: Final Rule, 61 FED. REG.
50951, 50952 (Sept. 30, 1996) (formerly codified at 12 U.S.C. § 560.2); Office of Thrift Su-
pervision, Subsidiaries and Equity Investments: Final Rule, 61 FED. REG. 66561, 66563
(Dec. 18, 1996) (formerly codified at 12 C.F.R. § 559.3(h); Dir. of Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion, James Edward Gilleran, Remarks before the Exchequer Club (May 21, 2003), http://
www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/speeches/ots-speech-ts096-05-21-2003.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WHD3-AA44].
92. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Federal Preemption and Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection: Past and Future, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 25 (Mar. 2012).
93. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Activities and Operations; Real
Estate Lending and Appraisals; Final Rule, 69 FED. REG. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (formerly
codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007-7.4009, 34.4).
94. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 92 (detailing history and role of regula-
tory preemption by banks); Christopher Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Un-
masking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2005) (describing how the
preemption claims masked a campaign to deregulate the financial services industry).
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2. State Litigation
States have the power to bring lawsuits to protect the rights of their
citizens, and to recover damages for themselves and for private individu-
als.95 Under state UDAP and anti-discrimination statutes, attorneys gen-
eral can seek civil penalties, compensation for victims, and injunctions
ordering firms to cease unlawful practices that harm consumers.96 In most
states, attorneys general do not have to prove as many elements as pri-
vate plaintiffs. In the case of UDAP claims, they are often relieved from
having to establish reliance, causation, and injury, and, instead, need only
prove that “the defendant’s acts had the tendency to deceive or were ca-
pable of deceiving.”97 Likewise, some states permit attorneys general to
obtain injunctive relief without demonstrating the common factors of ir-
reparable harm and inadequate remedy at law.98
Although most states held back from suing lenders either because they
did not have the resources to file complicated lawsuits that required ex-
tensive knowledge of the financial services industry and complicated
mortgage products or because they were captured by the industry,99 a
handful of states did pursue claims against abusive lenders long before
subprime loans became a national concern. New York’s attorney general,
together with other attorneys general, uncovered evidence that House-
hold International, Inc. (Household) had been deceiving borrowers by
failing to disclose key loan terms. In 2002, Household entered into a set-
tlement agreement with the states for $484 million.100 Later, state attor-
neys general individually and collectively brought lawsuits against
financial institutions, such as Ameriquest (2006) and Countrywide (2008),
under state UDAP statutes, which resulted in settlements totaling almost
$9 billion.101
The Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office was often at the front of
95. For a discussion of public enforcement of private rights, see generally Prentiss Cox,
Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 12 U. MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503999 [https://perma.cc/
R8HQ-2PUX].
96. When statutes fail to provide express enforcement authority to states, they have
used their authority as quasi-sovereigns to bring actions as parens patriae. Id. at 14-15
(noting that states rarely use their parens patriae power and when they do, they typically
seek injunctive relief or compensation to the state and not restitutionary relief for victims
of the wrongdoing).
97. Christopher J. Willis & Stefanie H. Jackson, What is an Attorney General’s Burden
of Proof? Evidentiary Requirements in UDAP Actions Brought by State Attorneys General,
STRAFFORD 35 (2010), http://media.straffordpub.com/products/udap-litigation-against-fi-
nancial-institutions-merging-theories-and-the-foreclosure-documentation-crisis-2010-11-
30/reference-material.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPE6-HG89].
98. Id. at 28.
99. Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws,
supra note 70, at 1905.
100. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Att’y Gen. Spitzer Announces Historic
$484 Million Agreement with Household Int’l, Inc. (Oct. 11, 2002), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/
about/ea/ea021011.htm [https://perma.cc/S3CM-5Y8W].
101. Willis & Jackson, supra note 97, at 210.
624 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
pack, securing settlements with Fremont Investment and Loan102 and Op-
tion One103 based on violations of state UDAP and anti-discrimination
laws. Attorneys general in Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, and Maine
also successfully recovered funds from mortgage lenders for violations of
state laws.104 For understandable reasons, states directed the proceeds
from their settlements to consumers and their own coffers. Scant dollars
were funneled to localities.
D. FEDERAL EFFORTS
1. Federal Laws
Until Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act or the Act) in 2010, there was
only one law directly addressing abusive mortgage loans.105 The Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), which Congress passed
in 1994, restricted or prohibited certain loan terms in high-cost, open-
ended home equity loans.106
Three years later, in 1997, Congress heard testimony about abusive
loans for home purchases and refinancing. A witness from the National
Consumer Law Center provided members of the Senate Banking Com-
mittee with evidence that foreclosures had tripled since 1982. In 2000,
2001, and 2004 there was further Congressional testimony from profes-
sors, attorneys, and consumer advocates about the escalating growth in
corrosive loans.107 Reporters told heart-wrenching stories of people
deceived by brokers and lenders into agreeing to unaffordable loans.
There was evidence of race-based steering of high-cost loans to borrowers
of color. And, more and more people were losing their homes.
Some members of the House and Senate sponsored federal anti-preda-
tory lending laws, but their proposals never made it out of committee.108
Thirteen years after Congress first heard testimony about abusive loans,
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which established a new federal
agency—the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).  The CFPB
has primary responsibility for consumer financial protection. The law ap-
plies uniformly to all entities that broker, originate, or service home
102. Press Release, Att’y Gen. of Mass., Att’y Gen. Martha Coakley Reaches $10 Mil-
lion Settlement with Subprime Lender Fremont Inv. and Loan (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www
.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2009/ag-coakley-reaches-10m-settlement-
with.html [https://perma.cc/FU73-M9XX].
103. Press Release, Att’y Gen. of Mass., H&R Block Mortg. Co. Will Provide $125
Million in Loan Modifications and Restitution (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.mass.gov/ago/
news-and-updates/press-releases/2011/option-one-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/8ZJB-
AATS].
104. Willis & Jackson, supra note 97.
105. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
106. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1639.
107. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 15, at 61. For an example, see Director of the Home
Defense Program of the Atlanta Legal Aid Soc’y, William J. Brennan, Jr., Test. Before the
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., H.R. (May 24, 2000), http://archives.financialservices
.house.gov/banking/52400bre.shtml [https://perma.cc/Y9AQ-WLPM].
108. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 15, at 153-54.
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mortgage loans, with one exception for small credit unions and deposi-
tory institutions.109 The Act eliminated the OTS and OCC preemption
rules, which means that financial institutions now have to comply with
state anti-predatory lending laws, even if the state laws impose more
stringent standards than their federal analogues.110 It is noteworthy that
nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act gives cities the power to curtail risky
lending.
For purposes of my argument, the failure of the federal government to
act to prevent the origination of abusive loans ultimately led to millions
of foreclosures. And, while the Dodd-Frank Act provides expanded pro-
tection for borrowers,111 which should also benefit cities by reducing
high-risk lending, many members of Congress would like to repeal the
Act.112 If that happens, cities will again be exposed to collateral damage
from unfair loans with no ability to protect themselves.
2. Federal Regulators
In the 1990s and early 2000s, federal regulators from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Department of the
Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, among others,
issued reports that raised concerns about abuses and inadequate disclo-
sures in the subprime loan market.113 In these early days of risky lending,
some regulators actively investigated and brought enforcement actions
against lenders, which I discuss in the next section. The OTS was the
banking regulator that most actively tried to stem predatory lending by
proposing new rules to govern depository institutions and by taking ac-
tion against thrifts that were making predatory loans.114 Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac joined the effort in 2000 when they amended their purchas-
ing guidelines to preclude their purchase of predatory loans.115
President Clinton’s presidency came to a close as regulated banks and
thrifts were entering the market with subprime loans. The election of
George W. Bush signaled a retreat from regulating home mortgage loans.
The same bank regulators that raised concerns about abusive loans re-
ported in 2004 that:
[T]heir monitoring and examination activities [ ] revealed little evi-
dence of predatory lending practices by federally regulated deposi-
109. Dodd-Frank §§ 1021(b), 1024-1026.
110. Dodd-Frank § 1026(a)(2). Institutions with $10 billion or less in total assets are
exempt from some of the provisions in the Act. 12 U.S.C. § 5516 (2012).
111. For a description of the borrower protections in the Dodd-Frank Act, see ENGEL
& MCCOY, supra note 15, at 228-33.
112. Kelsey Snell, Ryan releases plan to roll back Obama regulations, WASH. POST
(June 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/06/14/ryan-re-
leases-plan-to-roll-back-obama-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/FT6L-6867].
113. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 15, at 62.
114. Id. at 154.
115. Fannie Mae, Lender Letter No. 03-00: Eligibility of Mortgages to Borrowers with
Blemished Credit Records (Apr. 11, 2000); Bulletin 2000–1 (Washington, DC: Freddie Mac,
March 20, 2000), http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/ bulletins/pdf/b11001.pdf.
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tory institutions. Accordingly, most banking regulators reported that
they have taken no formal enforcement actions related to predatory
lending abuses by the institutions they supervise.116
To the extent the banking regulators took any action, it was primarily
to issue guidances that had no legal power. The OCC did promulgate a
UDAP rule requiring the banks they supervised to assess borrowers’ abil-
ity to repay; however, the rules were vague and left wiggle room for the
banks.117 The OTS was even worse. It pursued an unabashed deregu-
latory agenda.118
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors (the Board) was the entity
that could have stepped in early to effectively prevent reckless lending
and unaffordable loans. When Congress passed HOEPA, it included a
provision stating that:
The Board . . . shall prohibit acts or practices in connection with—
(A) mortgage loans that the Board finds to be unfair, deceptive, or
designed to evade the provisions of this section; and (B) refinancing
of mortgage loans that the Board finds to be associated with abusive
lending practices, or that are otherwise not in the interest of the
borrower.119
Alan Greenspan refused to act on this mandate from Congress, even
though loans were getting ever riskier under his watch. The only regula-
tory action the Board took was in 2001 to increase the range of loans
covered by HOEPA.120 In 2008, after Ben Bernanke had become the
Chair of the Board and as the subprime crisis was reaching its pinnacle,
the Board used its authority under HOEPA to adopt a rule to ban partic-
ularly risky home mortgage loans.121
3. Federal Litigation122
Beginning in the late 1990s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
brought a series of enforcement actions under the FTC Act against
nineteen lenders and brokers who were making predatory loans, includ-
116. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATTING PREDATORY LENDING 36 (2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7JU-EWL6].
117. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 15, at 169. The OCC also took the lead on inter-
agency guidance on interest-only and pay-option ARMS. Id.
118. Id. at 183.
119. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-325 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(p)(2)) (emphasis added).
120. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 15, at 195.
121. Id. at 196.
122. The FTC Act and FHA were not the only laws that federal agencies were charged
with enforcing. There was the TILA disclosure law, HOEPA, and RESPA. Engel &
McCoy, supra note 3, at 1305-308. The Dodd-Frank Act amended all three of these laws.
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ing Capital City Mortgage in 1998,123 Fleet Financial in 1999,124 First Alli-
ance Mortgage Company in 2000,125 and Citigroup in 2001.126 The
Department of Justice (DOJ), which was charged with enforcing the Fair
Housing Act (FHA), was less active than the FTC. Just the same, it pur-
sued enforcement actions for reverse-redlining claims against Huntington
Mortgage Corporation in 1995,127 Long Beach Mortgage in 1996,128 Fleet
Mortgage Corporation in 1996,129 and Delta Funding Corporation in
2000.130 During that time period, HUD, which enforces the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and the FHA, pursued some ad-
ministrative actions against lenders and brought several RESPA enforce-
ment claims.131
President George W. Bush took office in 2001. From that time until
President Obama took office, it does not appear that the federal agencies
initiated any new enforcement actions related to subprime or predatory
lending.
III. EFFORTS TO ADDRESS EXTERNALITIES132
The rapid growth of reckless, subprime lending triggered a generalized
financial crisis that led to a dramatic surge in foreclosures. Below, I re-
123. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Cap. City Mortg. Settles FTC Charges (Feb.
24, 2005), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2005/02/capital-city-mortgage-set-
tles-ftc-charges [https://perma.cc/L6JE-NCXC] (outlining settlement terms of $750,000 for
consumer redress and injunctive relief).
124. Complaint, FTC v. Fleet Fin., Inc., (FTC Oct. 5, 1999) (No. C3899), https://www.ftc
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1999/10/ftc.gov-fleetfinancecmp.htm [https://perma
.cc/RV28-RPWZ] (resulting in a $1.3 million settlement for consumers and injunctive
relief).
125. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Home Mortg. Lender Settles “Predatory
Lending” Charges (Mar. 21, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/03/
home-mortgage-lender-settles-predatory-lending-charges [https://perma.cc/2TFV-6LPX].
126. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Citigroup Settles FTC Charges Against the
Assocs. Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims (Sept. 19, 2002), https:/
/www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/09/citigroup-settles-ftc-charges-against-asso-
ciates-record-setting [https://perma.cc/CF8D-ADJ4] (reporting on $215 million settlement
with Citigroup for violations of the FTC Act).
127. Complaint, United States v. Huntington Mortg. Co. No. 1:95 CV 2211 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 18, 1995).
128. Complaint, United States v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., No. 96 Civ. 6159 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 5, 1996).
129. Complaint, United States v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., No. 96-CV-2279 (E.D. N.Y. May
7, 1996).
130. Complaint, United States v. Delta Funding Corp., No. 00-CV-01872 (E.D. N.Y.
2000).
131. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATTING PREDATORY LENDING, supra note
116, at 8-9.
132. By externalities, I mean situations in which cities bear the costs of transactions to
which they were not parties, and the parties to the transaction do not bear any of the costs
they impose on the communities. In the lending situation, financial service providers who
entered into exploitative lending contracts with borrowers, imposed costs on cities in the
form of reduced tax revenues, increased demand for social services, and costs to tear down
abandoned homes.
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view responses to the foreclosure crisis and evaluate the efforts at the
local, state, and federal levels, and their impact on localities.
A. FORECLOSURE, ABANDONMENT, AND DISTRESS133
Cities were not parties to the unaffordable mortgage loan contracts and
they did not invite the brokers and lenders into their communities. Yet,
cities have borne tremendous costs. Foreclosures led to property depreci-
ation of both foreclosed and nearby homes. Many properties did not pro-
duce any tax revenue.134 Cities took further hits to their tax proceeds
when homeowners, in response to declines in their property values, peti-
tioned to have their home values reassessed so their tax bills would be
lower. Cities ultimately lost billions in property tax revenue.135
By 2010, approximately eight percent of residential units in the country
were vacant.136 Properties became vacant when people moved out be-
cause they could not afford their mortgages or because they mistakenly
believed a foreclosure was imminent. When properties are vacant, cities
are hard-pressed to collect outstanding taxes. If a city cannot locate the
responsible party, it cannot recover the taxes nor can it drag the responsi-
ble party into court. And when banks or securitization trusts become
property owners following foreclosures, they can impede city efforts to
tax them by not recording their foreclosure deeds.137
Sometimes vacant properties end up in legal purgatory. The most fre-
quent scenario occurs when homeowners move out of their homes after
receiving foreclosure notices, and the banks or other financial institutions
elect not to follow through on the foreclosures because there are title
issues or because the outstanding taxes and liens exceed the value of the
property. If the foreclosures had been completed, the purchaser—usually
the foreclosing entity—would have to pay off any outstanding taxes and
133. Many authors have chronicled the damage communities have suffered. See David
Kane, Comment, Restoration Remedies for Remaining Residents, 61 UCLA L. REV. 812,
814-15, 825-28 (2014).
134. City tax collectors can obtain liens against the property for the unpaid amounts;
they can then seek to enforce the liens through a tax lien foreclosure. Depending on the
number of lienholders and the jurisdiction, such foreclosures can cost many thousands of
dollars. And at the end of the process, cities own property they often don’t want.
135. Vacant Properties: The True Cost to Communities, NAT’L VACANT PROP. CAM-
PAIGN 7 (Aug. 2005), http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/true-costs.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/2PBX-CPY7].
136. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATTING PREDATORY LENDING, supra note
116, at 8-9. Sixteen percent of homes that had mortgages were in some stage of foreclosure.
Ben Beachy, A Financial Crisis Manual: Causes, Consequences, And Lessons Of The Fi-
nancial Crisis (Global Dev. and Env’t Institute, Working Paper No. 12-06, 2012), http://
www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/12-06BeachyFinancialCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/54MF-
KWD6].
Properties are typically considered vacant when they have been unoccupied for at least
three months.
137. William Weber, Who’s Responsible? Liability for the Deterioration of Properties
Abandoned during or after Foreclosure Proceedings, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 663-64 (Win-
ter 2013).
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liens and, going forward, would be responsible for the real estate taxes
and property maintenance. Vacant properties that lenders have not fore-
closed upon are sometimes referred to as “zombie homes.” One mayor in
New York State reported that there is a zombie home on almost every
block in her town of Mastic Beach.138
Regardless of who owns the vacant property, it is cities that frequently
pick up the tab for maintenance. Empty houses invite trespassers who
start fires, run drug operations, and steal anything from toilets to copper
piping, all of which necessitate more active policing and fire protection.139
Cities also have the burden of mowing the lawns, boarding up windows,
and demolishing houses.140 One estimate of the cost to cities for each
abandoned141 property was between $7,000 and $30,0000.142 In 2014,
Cleveland had 6,000 condemned buildings to be torn down and another
6,000 abandoned buildings. The estimated cost of demolishing the 12,000
buildings was $120 million.143 These are all ex post costs, many of which
could have been avoided had cities been able to stop the risky, unafford-
able loans in their communities.144
Vacant and abandoned property also imposes costs on neighbors.145
Researchers have used various methods to calculate the impact of vacant,
abandoned, tax delinquent, and foreclosed property on the value of sur-
rounding homes. One study in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, found that home
values dropped by as much as 2.7 percent for each vacant and tax-delin-
quent property within 500 hundred feet.146
138. Tim Henderson, ‘Zombie Houses’ Multiply in Some States, STATELINE (Feb. 29,
2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/02/29/zom-
bie-houses-multiply-in-some-states.
139. See Kelly D. Edmiston,?Property Conditions and Neighborhood Crime, FED. RES.
BANK OF KANSAS CITY 10-13 (Jan. 15, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2567835 [https://perma.cc/DM7W-YD6C] (empirically demonstrating the rela-
tionship between crime and the condition of nearby properties); see generally Engel, supra
note 66, at 357-59; Kermit J. Lind, Perspectives on Abandoned Houses in a Time of Dys-
topia, 29 PROB. & PROP. 52, 53 (2015).
140. James J. Kelly, A Continuum in Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant Houses to the Mar-
ket, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 113 (2013); ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 15, at 143.
141. Property that is no longer being maintained is considered abandoned.
142. Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America’s Foreclosure Crisis, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUST 12 (Apr. 2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploaded
files/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/subprime_mortgages/defaultingonthedreampdf.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CJ8U-SGP6].
143. Lind, supra note 139, at 54.
144. The entire country felt the impact of risky loans, but some areas were hit harder
than others. In those places, the foreclosure crisis continues to hamper communities. See
generally Michael L. Hanley & Ruhi Maker, In the Eye of the Storm: Why the Threat of
Foreclosure Damage Continues, EMPIRE JUS. CENTER (Mar. 2015), http://www.empirejus-
tice.org/assets/pdf/publications/reports/monroe-report—in-the-eye-of-the-storm/report-in-
the-eye-of-the-storm.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DFS-NWEW].
145. Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, The Impact of Vacant, Tax-Delin-
quent, and Foreclosed Property on?Sales Prices of Neighboring Homes 35 (Fed. Res. Bank
of Cleveland, Working Paper 11:23R, Mar. 2012).
146. Id.; see also Norman G. Miller, Stephanie Y. Rauterkus & Michael A. Sklarz, The
Neighborhood Impact of Subprime Lending, Predatory Lending and Foreclosure,
HOYT GRP., http://hoytgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/The-Neighborhood-Impact
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Communities of color have been hit hardest by foreclosures because
many predatory and subprime lenders targeted people of color with the
worst loans.147 Studies by academic and government researchers have re-
peatedly revealed that white borrowers with the same credit profiles as
black and Latino borrowers often paid less for credit during the lending
boom.148 These practices were not only illegal and unfair, but also in-
creased the likelihood that people of color would default and their homes
would become vacant.149
The problem of vacant homes in cities intensified when whistleblowers
and consumer advocates uncovered serial wrongdoing and fraud among
mortgage loan servicers, who were responsible for foreclosing on prop-
erty. During the heyday of subprime lending, money flowed quickly, but
paperwork and recordkeeping was shoddy. Loans that were sold did not
always include the endorsements needed to transfer ownership. Similarly,
mortgages often lacked the requisite assignments when they were sold.
Other records reflecting payments and defaults were missing from the
files.
When it came time to foreclose on homes, law firm “foreclosure mills”
and servicers dealt with the missing paperwork and other issues that im-
peded efficient foreclosures by falsifying documents to give the impres-
sion that they had substantiated the right to foreclose. Once these frauds
were discovered, foreclosures came to a halt for a time. Years later, some
homes are still in limbo as servicers continue to search for the documents
necessary to prove they have a right to foreclose. The delays increased
blight because homeowners, knowing they were likely to lose their homes
in the future, had little reason to maintain their property.
The legal problems created by foreclosures differ from those created by
reckless subprime and predatory lending. In the latter case, the primary
legal challenge was regulating the exploitative financing activities of lend-
ers. In the former, the primary problem for cities was finding ways to
address vacant homes and blight.
B. CITY EFFORTS
1. City Ordinances
Cities harnessed their home rule authority—sometimes successfully,
sometimes not—to ameliorate the vacancies and neighborhood distress
that subprime lending left in its wake.
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BBS-FZYV] (discussing research on the impact of foreclosures on
area home values).
147. See generally Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook, URB. INST.
6 (Apr. 2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000194-
Housing-Finance-Chartbook-April-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBS7-92T2].
148. Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Claims, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2012), http://nyti.ms/M4YN4A [https://perma.cc/SYX8-X8LZ].
149. KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS
TO AMERICA 79, 89-99 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty, eds., 2008); ENGEL & MC-
COY, supra note 15, at 22, 28.
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a. Property Registration
To address the problem of uncertainty about who owned property, nu-
merous cities passed ordinances requiring that lenders register vacant
properties so the cities would know to whom to send tax bills and against
whom to enforce code violations.150 The problem with these ordinances is
that if the owners of vacant properties fail to comply with the registration
requirements, cities have no idea who to fine for violating the ordinances
requiring them to register.
b. Mow to Own
In recent years, cities employed imaginative vehicles to help defray
some of the maintenance costs associated with abandoned properties.
Several cities adopted programs coined “mow to own,” through which
people earn $25 in credit toward a home purchase every time they mow
the lawn of an abandoned home.151
c. Receivership
Cities have also passed ordinances allowing community development
non-profits to file petitions with courts asking to be named receivers of
vacant properties that are creating nuisances and violating local codes.
Once appointed, the organizations can repair and maintain the property.
A lien for their expenses is placed on the property and the organizations
can then foreclose on the lien and obtain title to the property unless an-
other lienholder steps in to cover the cost of the repairs. Cities’ ability to
use receivership in this manner without state legislative approval depends
on the scope of their home rule authority152
d. Eminent Domain
Some cities have explored using the age-old tool of eminent domain to
seize underwater153 mortgages and negotiate new mortgage loans with
homeowners.154 Using these powers, cities would pay the fair market
150. Webber, supra note 155 at 671-3; Raymond Brescia & Nicholas Martin, The Price
of Crisis: Eminent Domain, Local Governments, and the Value of Underwater Mortgages,
24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (draft at 15), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498651 [https://perma.cc/D2BT-M3SG].
151. See Linda A. Moore, Memphis mow-to-own program passes final vote in City
Council, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/
government/city/memphis-mow-to-own-program-passes-final-vote-in-city-council-
24abb49c-9791-7630-e053-0100007fa76d-351215011.html [https://perma.cc/MY3Q-SDE6].
152. Kelly, supra note 140, at 132-34.
153. The term underwater means the value of the home is less than the amount owed
on the mortgage loan.
154. For an excellent discussion of the use of eminent domain powers to reform mort-
gage terms, see generally, Brescia & Martin, supra note 150. For a discussion of the legal
and practical hurdles to using eminent domain in this fashion, see Jacob R. Shelton, Consti-
tutional Constraints on Using Eminent Domain to Write-Down Underwater Mortgages, 13
CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 46 (2015).
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value of the mortgages155 to the owners of the loans, which typically
would be securitization trusts. The cities would then assist the borrowers
in obtaining new loans, or the cities might initially finance the loans them-
selves. The loans would have significantly lower principal amounts, taking
into account the market value of the property. The loans could poten-
tially even be sold back into the original securitization trusts.156
The goals of eminent domain proposals are to prevent foreclosures and
neighborhood blight while minimizing the losses to investors in securitiza-
tion trusts. Proponents argue that investors have good reasons to support
this use of eminent domain. In 2015, fifteen percent of homes with values
under $200,000 were underwater.157 As many as seventy percent of seri-
ously underwater homes go into foreclosure,158 and the recovery on fore-
closed homes is significantly less than the amount of the mortgage loans
secured by the properties. Lastly, evidence shows that mortgage loans
with principle reductions are less likely to redefault than loans with other
types of modifications.159 As of the writing of this Article, no cities have
implemented a plan to seize mortgages using their eminent domain
powers.160
2. City Litigation161
Left with abandoned property, reduced tax revenues, and increased
calls for police and fire protection, cities turned to the courts to seek
155. Alternatively, cities could pay the mortgagees a percent of the fair market value of
the property.
156. Brescia & Martin, supra note 150. Commentators have explored a number of dif-
ferent models, including having the securitization trusts loan the money to municipalities
to buy the loans on underwater homes. The cities would then re-convey the modified loans
back to the trusts as payment or make monthly payments to the bondholders from the
amounts the homeowners remit. See Brian Cullin, Taking on Water: Local Government,
Eminent Domain, and the Foreclosure Crisis, 4 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 1, 3-5 (2014);
Robert Hockett, “We Don’t Follow, We Lead:” How New York City Will Save Mortgage
Loans by Condemning Them, 124 YALE L. J. F. 131, 136, 138 (2014).
157. Paul Solman, Why the foreclosure crisis isn’t over yet, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 24,
2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/foreclosure-crisis-isnt-yet/
[https://perma.cc/26ZS-MPWP]. Among more expensive homes, five to six percent were
underwater in 2015. Id.
158. Hockett, supra note 156, at 134.
159. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM:
TREASURY COULD MORE CONSISTENTLY ANALYZE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
HOUSING PROGRAM CHANGES 23 (July 2015), http://gao.gov/assets/680/671167.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6J8U-PGGT].
160. See generally Lydia DePillis, Wall Street has so far crushed a drastic foreclosure fix.
One California town could change that., WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/10/wall-street-has-so-far-crushed-a-drastic-foreclo-
sure-fix-one-california-town-could-change-that/ [https://perma.cc/M4VG-3247]; Marc Joffe,
Social impact bonds: A better way to combat blight, CAL. ECON. SUMMIT (July 13, 2015),
http://www.caeconomy.org/reporting/entry/social-impact-bonds-a-better-way-to-combat-
blight [https://perma.cc/U6WN-4F9N].
161. For a deeper discussion of the lawsuits that municipalities brought against lenders,
see Kathleen C. Engel, The State of Play in City Claims against Financial Firms, 40
FORDHAM URB. L. J. CITY SQUARE 82 (2014); see also KATHLEEN MORRIS, HOW CITIES
WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF POPULATION FLOWS,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 189, 192-201 (Ray Brescia and John Travis
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damages they alleged were caused by lenders making unaffordable loans
that resulted in foreclosures.
a. Housing Code Enforcement
Housing codes give cities the power to sanction homeowners who do
not maintain their properties. Code enforcement is not a panacea. For
cities with limited resources for housing inspectors and tens of thousands
of homes with code violations, it is impossible to fully enforce the codes.
Even when homeowners are cited, many do not have the financial re-
sources to make the required repairs. Too often properties are vacant and
the citations go unheeded.162
Cleveland, which was the epicenter of abusive loans, tried to use hous-
ing code violations to force owners of foreclosed homes to maintain their
properties. If the owners were in the area, it was not difficult to drag
them into the Cleveland Housing Court; however, Wall Street banks
rarely showed up to hearings. Judge Pianka of the Housing Court began
trying the corporations, even though they had not appeared in court. The
trials in absentia led to fines of $1.4 million against multiple financial ser-
vices companies. The Ohio Supreme Court eventually held that Judge Pi-
anka could not try the property owners in absentia.163
Indio, California, adopted a criminal ordinance that allowed the city to
impose misdemeanor fines on homeowners who did not maintain their
properties. Indio used this ordinance to go after Citibank and Washington
Marshall, eds., 2016) (cataloging recent efforts by cities to curtail activities that were
harming their communities); see generally Raymond Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and
Private Harms: The Standing of Municipalities in Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial
Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y (2012) (discussing the
challenges cities face when bringing claims that address broad social issues). Counties have
brought fraud actions against the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). The
Illinois county of St. Clair settled a lawsuit against MERS for $800,000 based on allegations
that MERS had committed fraud by evading requirements that mortgages be filed with the
county recorder. St. Clair Cnty, Ill. v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2012 WL
11966902 (Ill. Cir. Ct.); Beth Hundsdorfer, St. Clair County settles lawsuit against banks for
$800,000, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.bnd.com/news/local/
article47324295.html [https://perma.cc/MV7Y-7269]. Other localities have filed similar suits
alleging they are entitled to recover the recording fees that the MERS system evaded. E.g.,
Cnty of Ramsey v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 776 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2014) (reporting on
two counties suing MERS); Ellen Brown, The Looming Foreclosure Crisis: As the Fed
Runs Out of Bullets, Local Governments Step In, HUFFPOST BUS. (July 8, 2014), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/ellen-brown/the-looming-foreclosure-c_b_5561871.html [https://perma
.cc/WB38-FN73]. In jurisdictions that do not mandate recording of title transfers, courts
have dismissed claims against MERS. Ben Lane, MERS wins in class-action suit from
Minnesota counties, HOUSINGWIRE (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/
32434-mers-wins-in-class-action-suit-from-minnesota-counties [https://perma.cc/4995-
LEX9].
162. Kelly, supra note 140, at 111.
163. Cleveland v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 929 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2010). For a discussion of
Judge Pianka’s efforts, see Creola Johnson, Fakers, Breachers, Slackers, and Deceivers: Op-
portunistic Actors during the Foreclosure Crisis Deserve Criminal Sanctions, 40 CAP. U. L.
REV. 853, 853-57 (2012); Joe Guillen, Ohio Supreme Court rules against city of Cleveland in
housing case, PLAIN DEALER (May 26, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/
2010/05/ohio_supreme_court_rules_again.html [https://perma.cc/R6LU-LJCN].
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Mutual, and even securitization trusts that neglected properties upon
which they had foreclosed.164
b. Public Nuisance Claims165
Cities have harnessed the tort of public nuisance to try to stop activities
that constitute “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.”166 Factors that:
[M]ay sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is
unreasonable include . . . whether the conduct involves a significant
interference with the public health, the public safety, the public
peace, the public comfort or the public convenience.167
Under this rubric, cities have sought injunctions and damages against
slaughterhouses, predatory lenders, and handgun, tobacco and lead paint
manufacturers.168 Occasionally, cities have been able to obtain injunc-
tions to abate nuisances;169 however, courts have moved away from al-
lowing equitable relief in city nuisance actions unless the cities
themselves have been injured.170
The City of Cleveland brought nuisance claims against investment and
commercial banks that funded the subprime lending industry, hoping to
recover for the damage that risky loans had caused the City.171 The fed-
eral court that heard the case dismissed the suit on the grounds of state
law preemption, the economic loss rule, and lack of proximate cause.172
Buffalo,173 Cincinnati,174 and Los Angeles175 later brought similar
claims against numerous banks alleging that they violated nuisance laws
164. Nicholas Casey, Banker: ‘What’d I Do Wrong, Officer?’ Cop: ‘You’ve Got Algae in
the Pool, Sir,’ WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1241125092772745
33 [https://perma.cc/R8L9-T68S].
165. For a detailed discussion of the muddled history and application of public and
private nuisance law, see generally Kermit J. Lind, Can Public Nuisance Law Protect Your
Neighborhood from Big Banks? 64 SUFF. U. L. REV. 89 (2011).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
167. Id.
168. See Grand Rapids v. Weiden, 56 N.W. 233 (Mich. 1893) (slaughterhouse); Cleve-
land v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., No. 08CV00139, 2008 WL 4600486 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 8,
2008) (predatory lending); White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(handguns); Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 973 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (tobacco);
California v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 100CV788657, 2014 WL 1385823 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. 26, 2014) (Trial Order) (lead paint).
169. E.g., Atlantic Richfield Co., 2014 WL 1385823 (Trial Order) (in lawsuit brought by
several localities, issuing an injunction ordering three of the defendants to pay $1.15 billion
to abate lead paint in homes).
170. Brescia, supra note 161, at 38-45.
171. Complaint, Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., No. 08CV00139, 2008 WL
4600486 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2008).
172. Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
173. Buffalo v. ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc., No. 2200-2008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11,
2009) (order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss in part without prejudice).
174. Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., No. 1:12-CV-104, 2016 WL
2897472 (S.D. Ohio May 18, 2016) (denying in part Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary
judgment).
175. Los Angeles v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. BC460878 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Apr. 23, 2013) (denying Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss).
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by failing to maintain properties on which they had foreclosed. Thus far,
their claims have not been dismissed.
c. Fair Housing Claims
Several cities brought lawsuits against mortgage lenders under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA).176 The cities claimed that banks peddled high-cost
subprime loans to African-American borrowers who would have quali-
fied for less expensive, prime loans. Many of the borrowers could not
afford their loans and lost their homes to foreclosure, driving down prop-
erty values and tax revenues for the cities, while at the same time leading
to increased demand for city health and safety services.177 In Baltimore,
city officials produced evidence that over half of the homes on which
Wells Fargo foreclosed between 2005 and 2008 became vacant and over
seventy percent were in predominantly African-American
neighborhoods.178
Decades ago in Havens Realty v. Coleman,179 the Supreme Court ap-
plied a relaxed standing requirement for city claims under the Fair Hous-
ing Act. Just the same, lenders contested liability in FHA claims brought
by cities on the grounds that: (1) the cities did not meet the Article III
injury requirement;180 and (2) they could not establish proximate cause
because intervening causes, such as the recession, broke the chain of cau-
sation between any actions of the defendants and the cities’ alleged
injuries.181
Courts have reached inconsistent results when reviewing cities’ fair
housing claims. A federal district court in California held that the City of
Los Angeles met Article III standing requirements.182 Wells Fargo ap-
176. For a discussion of the various lawsuits cities have brought alleging violations of
the FHA, see Engel, supra note 161, at 83-85; Samuel Marll, Do Municipalities have Article
III Standing to Sue Mortgage Lenders under the Fair Housing Act? 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 253,
258-60 (2012).
177. Sudarshan Varadhan, Judge denies Wells Fargo’s bid to dismiss L.A. predatory
lending suit, REUTERS (May 29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wellsfargo-
lawsuit-idUSKBN0E906020140529 [https://perma.cc/G97N-SUKB]; Dena Aubin, Oakland
lawsuit accuses Wells Fargo of mortgage discrimination, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-wellsfargo-discrimination-idUSKCN0RM28L20150922 [https://
perma.cc/U89S-RRFV]; Dena Aubin, Los Angeles drops mortgage-discrimination case
against JPMorgan, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-
losangeles-lawsuit-idUSKCN0R31WZ20150903 [https://perma.cc/U23P-2CTR]; Mary B.
Hogan, A Novel Suit: Cities Try On The FHA for Size, LAW360 (July 29, 2014), http://www
.law360.com/articles/559808/a-novel-suit-cities-try-on-the-fha-for-size [https://perma.cc/
EB7Q-4KPB].
178. Michael Powell, Banks Accused of Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES
(June 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/us/07baltimore.html?_r=0 [https://per
ma.cc/E532-YACD].
179. 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1124 (1982). The Court reaffirmed this standard in Gladstone Real-
tors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 108, 110-11 (1979) (holding that standing under the
FHA is “as broad as is permitted by [Article III] of the Constitution”).
180. See Marll, supra note 176, at 254-55.
181. See Hogan, supra note 177.
182. Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1055-58 (C.D. Cal. 2014);
see also Cnty of Cook v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2015 WL 1303313 at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
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pealed the district court’s decision and the Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled
on the appeal.
The City of Miami also brought an FHA lawsuit against Wells Fargo183
alleging that reverse redlining184 led to increased foreclosures, which in-
creased the City’s costs and decreased its revenue. The District Court dis-
missed Miami’s lawsuit based on a failure to adequately plead proximate
cause and because “the alleged injuries fell outside the statute’s ‘zone of
interest.’”185 The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court,186 hold-
ing that the allegation that Miami had lost tax revenue was sufficient to
establish standing under Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.187
Likewise, the appellate court found that Miami’s proximate cause allega-
tions did not defeat Article III standing.188 On March 4, 2016, Wells
Fargo petitioned the Supreme Court to dismiss Miami’s claims for lack of
standing.189 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Wells Fargo’s
writ.190
The City of Memphis brought a similar suit against Wells Fargo. The
federal District Court ruled that Memphis had standing under the FHA
and under the state’s consumer protection law.191 The case later settled
for $132.5 million.192 Baltimore193 also brought suit against Wells Fargo
under the FHA.194 The DOJ subsequently began investigating Wells
Fargo’s lending practices in Baltimore and found evidence of discrimina-
tion based on race. Wells Fargo settled with DOJ and the City of Balti-
more for $178 million.195 Not all FHA claims by cities made it past
(denying Bank of America’s motion to dismiss based on lack of standing in a Cook County
FHA claim).
183. Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 801 F.3d 1258, 1258 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Miami, 136 S.Ct. 2545 (2016). Miami also brought companion cases
against Bank of America and Citigroup. See Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262,
1262-63 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, Fla., 136 S. Ct.
2544 (2016); Miami v. Citigroup, Inc., 801 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2015). Miami also brought
unjust enrichment claims against the banks. Citigroup, Inc., 801 F.3d at 1268.
184. Reverse red-lining is the targeting of high-cost loans to people of color.
185. Wells Fargo, 801 F.3d at 1258; see also Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 13-cv-
24508, 2014 WL 11380948 at *2 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (dismissing complaint). The District Court
also held that the City’s claims were outside the statute of limitations. Id.
186. Wells Fargo, 801 F.3d at 1265.
187. 441 U.S. 91, 113-16 (1979).
188. Wells Fargo, 801 F.3d at 1265-66.
189. Alana Semuels, Who Can Go After Banks for the Foreclosure Crisis?, ATLANTIC
(May 3, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05/who-can-go-after-bank
s-for-the-foreclosure-crisis/480588/ [https://perma.cc/94TS-PNVD].
190. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Miami, 136 S.Ct. 2545 (2016).
191. Memphis v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 WL 1706756 at *8-10 (W.D.
Tenn. May 4, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss).
192. Ted Avanoff, Wells Fargo Goes from Foe to Partner in Memphis, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (June 3, 2012), http://www.commercialappeal.com/business/wells-fargo-goes-from-
foe-to-partner-in-memphis-ep-385748672-323882731.html [https://perma.cc/FKF6-3ACA].
193. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62,
2011 WL 1557759 at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (prohibiting creditors from discriminating based on an
applicant’s protected class).
195. Ylan Q. Mui, Wells Fargo, Justice Department settle discrimination case for $175
Million, WASH. POST (July 12, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
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motions to dismiss. In 2009, a federal court dismissed a Birmingham, Ala-
bama, FHA suit against Citigroup for lack of standing.196
Suits alleging that banks engaged in redlining197 are also working their
way through the courts. In 2014, the City of Providence, Rhode Island,
sued Santander Bank under the FHA on the grounds that, after the finan-
cial crisis, the bank reduced its home mortgage loans in parts of the city
where a significant percent of people of color live, while increasing loans
to those in parts of the City where whites live. The case settled for $1.3
million.198
C. STATE EFFORTS
States initiated a number of efforts to help homeowners avoid foreclo-
sure; these programs helped reduce the burden of vacant homes on mu-
nicipalities. The programs included funding to refinance borrowers into
affordable loans and also providing smaller loans to help borrowers man-
age short-term cash flow problems. To connect people with resources to
help them keep their homes, states funded consumer counseling and me-
dia campaigns to educate borrowers about their options. Some states also
began regulating “foreclosure rescue scams,” which promised to save bor-
rowers from foreclosure. The scams provided few or no services and
charged high fees.199
In New York, Attorney General Eric Schneiderman negotiated a deal
with financial institutions representing seventy percent of the state’s
mortgage market to adopt “best practices” for addressing the problems
caused by vacant and abandoned homes. Under the agreement, banks
and other entities inspect properties with delinquent mortgage loans to
determine whether they are occupied or require repairs. The firms also
register any abandoned or vacant properties with the state.200
wells-fargo-justice-department-settle-discrimination-case-for-175-million/2012/07/12/gJQA
X66ZgW_story.html [https://perma.cc/998H-FPUB].
196. See Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 WL 8652915 (N.D.
Ala. 2009). Three Georgia counties have lawsuits pending against several financial institu-
tions, alleging reverse red-lining. See Cobb County, DeKalb County, and Fulton County,
Georgia File Federal Fair Housing Act Lawsuit Against Bank of America Corp., Bank of
America, N.A., Countrywide Financial Corp., Countywide Bank, FSB, and Merrill Lynch &
Co. for Discriminatory Mortgage Lending, Servicing and Foreclosure Practices: Civil Action




2XMT-CEE2]; see also Dekalb Cnty v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-03640-
SCJ, 2013 WL 7874104 at *1 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
197. Red-lining is the practice of refusing to make loans to people of color.
198. Providence settles redlining lawsuit with Santander Bank, PROVIDENCE J. (May 29,
2016), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20141105/News/311059930 [https://perma
.cc/WGT4-TLEJ].
199. See generally Defaulting on the Dream: States Respond to America’s Foreclosure
Crisis, supra note 142.
200. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Gov. Cuomo Announces Major Mortg.
Cos. Agree to Measures to Combat Vacant and Abandoned “Zombie Properties” (May 18,
2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1505181.htm [https://perma.cc/T5EA-TKN6].
638 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
D. FEDERAL EFFORTS
1. Federal Laws and Programs
When the foreclosure crisis began, the federal government showed lit-
tle interest in helping homeowners. Loan modifications were off the ta-
ble, as was government-sponsored counseling for borrowers in trouble.201
President Bush did establish a program called FHA-Secure, which al-
lowed creditworthy borrowers to refinance unaffordable loans into Fed-
eral Housing Administration- insured loans. Over three years, just over
4000 loans were refinanced through the FHA-Secure program.202 At that
time, millions of borrowers were facing foreclosure because they could
not afford their loan payments.  A second refinancing program under
President Bush, Home for Homeowners, was an even bigger failure: only
71 borrowers had their loans refinanced.203
The Bush government did recognize that subprime loans were devas-
tating communities and responded by creating the Neighborhood Stabili-
zation Program (NSP) as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008 (HERA).204 Congress channeled $7 billion dollars to areas
that were suffering the most from foreclosures and the financial crisis.205
Unfortunately, the size of the fund was small relative to the ongoing
crisis.
The federal government under President Obama created the Home Af-
fordable Modification Program (HAMP),206 the Home Affordable Refi-
nance Program (HARP),207 and other programs designed to increase
loan modifications with the goal of reducing foreclosures. With many mil-
lions of borrowers in foreclosure or underwater, there was great hope
that the federal programs would help restore a healthy housing market.
That did not happen. Seventy percent of those who applied under HAMP
were denied modifications.208 Those who received modifications often
had large amounts of deferred principal and balloon payments tacked
onto the end of their loans. The technical details of the program were
regularly changing, which meant servicers had to constantly tinker with
their systems and retrain their workers. Other federal programs suffered
from similar problems.209
201. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 15, at 82-83.
202. Marc Gans, HAMP: Doomed From The Start, 10 CORNELL REAL ESTATE REV. 54
(2012).
203. Id.
204. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654.
205. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZA-
TION PROGRAM 1 (July 2011), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/OCCN
SPFactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MNG-RRSB].
206. 12 U.S.C. 5201, et seq.
207. Id.
208. Brena Swanson, SIGTARP report reveals massive failure of HAMP, HOUS. WIRE
(July 29, 2015), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/34609-sigtarp-report-reveals-massive-
failure-of-hamp [https://perma.cc/9TN3-V79Z].
209. Id.; Raymond H. Brescia, Elizabeth A. Kelly & John Travis Marshall, Crisis Man-
agement: Principles that Should Guide the Disposition of Federally Owned, Foreclosed
Properties, 45 IND. L. REV. 305, 309-13, (citing Legislative Proposals to End Taxpayer
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Both HAMP and HARP will expire at the end of 2016,210 yet the fore-
closure crisis continues. As of 2016, over 6 million homes have gone into
foreclosure,211 400,000 homes are in the process of being foreclosed
upon,212 almost 1.2 million mortgage loans are seriously delinquent,213
and 3.2 million homeowners are underwater.214 Plus, there is still a back-
log of homes that are slated for foreclosure. As evidence of this, in twenty
states, the number of foreclosure “starts” has increased from a year
ago.215
Some of the ways the federal government handled loans in default ac-
tually exacerbated the distress in blighted communities. For example, in
order to replenish funds in the Federal Housing Administration insurance
program, HUD decided to sell Federal Housing Administration-insured
loans that were in default to the highest bidders, primarily private equity
firms. The problem with this approach is that private equity firms had no
interest or expertise in stabilizing neighborhoods.
HUD could have sold the loans to community development financial
institutions216 or other entities whose business models focused on invest-
ing in borrowers and neighborhoods, not in “extracting maximum profit
Funding for Ineffective Foreclosure Mitigation Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Ins., Hous., and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 32
(2011) (prepared statement of Hon. Neil Barofsky, Spec. Inspector Gen., Troubled Asset
Relief Program)). As increasing numbers of homes went into foreclosure, many people
called on the federal government to develop a program akin to the Depression-era Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation, under which the government issued bonds the proceeds of
which were used to purchase and refinance underwater homes. Id. at 315-22.
210. Brian Honea, FHFA Announces Extension of HARP and HAMP Until the End of
2016, DS News (May 8, 2015), http://www.dsnews.com/news/05-08-2015/fhfa-announces-ex-
tension-of-harp-and-hamp-until-the-end-of-2016.
211. 37,000 Completed U.S. Foreclosures in October, Says CoreLogic, WORLD PROP. J.




212. National Foreclosure Report: February 2016, CORE LOGIC 4 (Feb. 2016), http://
www.corelogic.com/research/foreclosure-report/national-foreclosure-report-february-2016
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET6L-5H3N].
213. Id. at 5.
214. Diana Olick, How are millions still underwater as home prices rise? CNBC (Apr. 4,
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/04/how-are-millions-still-underwater-as-home-prices-
rise.html [https://perma.cc/ZGA9-AB5B].
215. Daren Bloomquist, Q1 2016 Foreclosure Activity Below Pre-Recession Levels in 36
Percent of U.S. Housing Markets, REALTYTRAC (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.realtytrac.com
/news/foreclosure-trends/q1-2016-u-s-foreclosure-market-report/ [https://perma.cc/LE3Z-
J9CX]. Professor Matthew J. Rossman takes the position that “the political will to fund
these initiatives began to evaporate as the national housing market ended its freefall, but
well before many communities had shown signs of recovering home values.” Matthew J.
Rossman, Counting Casualties in Communities Hit Hardest by the Foreclosure Crisis, 2016
UTAH L. REV. 245, 265 (2016).
216. See Press Release, N.J. Cmty. Cap., N.J. Cmty. Cap. to Help Hundreds of Home-
owners Avoid Foreclosure (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.newjerseycommunitycapital.org/
about-us/media/new-jersey-community-capital-help-hundreds-homeowners-avoid-foreclo-
sure [https://perma.cc/A4F6-G6X2] (describing New Jersey Community Capital’s purchase
of distressed mortgage loans from HUD with the goal of financing new loans for borrowers
so they can remain in their homes).
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for the benefit of investors.”217 Alternatively, HUD could have crammed
down the principal amounts of borrowers’ loans. HUD was selling the
loans for between fifty and seventy-seven percent of the value of the
property.218 Had HUD reduced the principal balances of borrowers’
mortgage loans by these amounts, at least some, if not many, of the bor-
rowers could have kept their homes. By pursuing what it believed to be
the highest possible return for the Federal Housing Administration insur-
ance program, HUD ignored its legally mandated mission to stabilize
neighborhoods.219
For borrowers, HUD’s sale of their loans had an additional impact; if
the purchasers of their loans did not participate in the HAMP loan modi-
fication program, the borrowers could not take advantage of the HAMP
benefits that might have enabled them to keep their homes.220
HUD was not the only federal entity that auctioned its loans to the
highest bidders, rather than to bidders who would help communities re-
cover. Freddie Mac sold hundreds of billions of dollars of defaulted loans
to for-profit companies.221 At the same time, the Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency (FHFA), the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
refused to write down the principal on loans that it held in portfolio or
that it guaranteed.222 Not until April 2016 did the FHFA institute a pro-
gram to reduce the principal on delinquent, underwater mortgage loans
owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.223
217. Connie M. Razza, Vulture Capital Hits Home, RIGHT TO THE CITY ALLIANCE &
THE CENTER FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY 7 (Sept. 2014), https://populardemocracy.org/
sites/default/files/HUD.DASP_.RTC_.v15.pdf [https://perma.cc/48F5-RZY2]; see also Jared
Bennett, HUD mortgage sales harm black neighborhoods, lawsuit says, CENTER FOR PUB-
LIC INTEGRITY (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/08/17/20073/hud-mort-
gage-sales-harm-black-neighborhoods-lawsuit-says (describing class action lawsuit against
HUD claiming that HUD’s auction program discriminates against African-American
neighborhoods).
218. Razza, supra note 217, at 4.
219. For borrowers, HUD’s sale of their loans had an additional impact; if the purchas-
ers of their loans did not participate in the HAMP loan modification program, the borrow-
ers could not take advantage of the HAMP benefits that might have enabled them to keep
their homes.
220. Rachel Laforest & Kevin Whelan, Communities lose when HUD sells loans to Wall
Street, HILL (Oct. 2, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/219380-
communities-lose-when-hud-sells-loans-to-wall-street [https://perma.cc/JZ5F-GVRB].
221. Razza, supra note 217, at 2.
222. Christopher Matthews, Is Fannie and Freddie Honcho Ed DeMarco “America’s
Most Dangerous Man?”, TIME (Apr. 11, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/04/11/is-fan-
nie-and-freddie-honcho-ed-demarco-americas-most-dangerous-man/ [https://perma.cc/
M4DK-4LPF].
223. News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Principal Reduction
Modification Program and Further Enhancements to NPL Sales Requirements (Apr. 14,
2016), http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-PRM-Program-
and-Further-Enhancements-to-NPL-Sales-Reqts.aspx [https://perma.cc/A6SL-4M6X]. In a
parallel move, in May 2016, HUD announced that it would issue new rules governing the
types of modifications purchasers of government-guaranteed loans could negotiate; this
move was in response to reports that the purchasers were not modifying loans to make
them affordable to the homeowners. Matthew Goldstein, Housing Agency Plans Mortgage
Sale Reforms after Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/
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There is another way in which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were com-
plicit in the deterioration of neighborhoods. Both entities, through their
conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, have successfully chal-
lenged the requirement that they comply with local ordinances requiring
the registration of vacant properties they own.224  By avoiding registering
the properties they own, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac avoid taking re-
sponsibility for maintaining the properties.
2. Federal Litigation
In contrast to the George W. Bush years, the federal government under
President Obama forcefully pursued claims against banks, servicers, and
other providers of financial services. 225 For example, in 2009, the FTC
brought suit against a company that was engaged in foreclosure relief
scams.226 In 2011, Bank of America settled with DOJ for $335 million
based on evidence that its former subsidiary, Countrywide, had charged
equally qualified African-American and Hispanic borrowers more than
whites.227 In 2014, Bank of America again settled with DOJ, this time for
$16.65 billion.228 The claims against Bank of America arose from its own
and its subsidiaries’ origination and securitization activities. Seven billion
dollars was dedicated to homeowner relief.229
Private and public interest attorneys asked agencies like HUD and
DOJ to join them in bringing claims for unfair lending. For example, in
2012, the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) filed a complaint with
HUD alleging that Wells Fargo did a better job maintaining and market-
ing properties in white neighborhoods than the bank did in predomi-
nantly black and Latino communities.230 HUD, NFHA, and numerous
18/business/dealbook/housing-agency-plans-mortgage-sale-reforms-after-criticism.html
[https://perma.cc/X3EV-DLXB].
224. Matthew Connelly, Rejecting Federal Preference: Why Courts Should not Exempt
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Properties from Cities’ Vacant Property Registration Ordi-
nances, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 181.
225. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was created by Dodd-Frank,
has been thoroughly investigating lenders and servicers, and where investigators have un-
covered evidence of wrongdoing, pursued many lawsuits under an array of federal laws
since the agency went live in 2011.
226. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Fed. & State Agencies Target Mortg. Foreclo-
sure Rescue and Loan Modification Scams (July 15, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2009/07/federal-state-agencies-target-mortgage-foreclosure-rescue-
loan [https://perma.cc/2HG5-ZSKB].
227. Bank of America settles discrimination suit for $335M, CBS MONEY WATCH (Dec.
21, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bank-of-america-settles-discrimination-suit-for-
335m/ [https://perma.cc/75WZ-LSMP].
228. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in His-
toric Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the




230. NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, ZIP CODE INEQUALITY: DISCRIMINATION BY
BANKS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HOMES IN NEIGHBORHOODS OF COLOR (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.mvfairhousing.com/ai2015/2014-08-24_ZIP_Code_Inequality.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7KS9-5EFC] [hereinafter ZIP CODE INEQUALITY].
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fair housing organizations settled with Wells Fargo for over $39 million
that will go toward helping neighborhoods recover.231
Similarly, state attorneys general sometimes partner with federal agen-
cies. When servicing abuses came to light in the late 2000s, state attorneys
general, DOJ, and HUD put together a $25 billion settlement with the
five largest mortgage servicers.232 The bulk of the settlement dollars were
dedicated to providing borrowers with relief through short sales,233 loan
modifications, and principal reductions. Sources have reported that be-
tween $3.5 and $4.25 billion was to be distributed to the states.234
For understandable reasons, the settlements in the federal cases fo-
cused primarily on providing relief to homeowners. Just the same, the
terms of some agreements did channel money to non-profit organizations
to fund neighborhood stabilization projects to combat blight. And while
some states did use part of their settlement proceeds to help local govern-
ments in struggling communities, none of the settlements contained out-
lays to municipal governments.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXPANDING LOCALITIES’
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE LENDERS
OF HOME LOANS
In reviewing local, state, and federal responses first to predatory and
subprime lending, and then to the foreclosure crisis, some patterns
emerge. The first is that communities’ hands are tied by home rule and
standing doctrines. They lacked the power to stop exploitative home
mortgage loans. Similarly, it was extremely difficult for them to obtain
compensation for the damage such loans caused. A second pattern is that
states are not reliable protectors of localities. States can be passive in the
231. NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, THE BANKS ARE BACK-OUR NEIGHBORHOODS
ARE NOT (2012), http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/REO%20powerpoint%20
Webinar.pdf; ZIP CODE INEQUALITY, supra note 230; Press Release, Nat’l Fair Hous. Alli-
ance, Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance and Wells Fargo Announce Collaboration To Rebuild
NFHA Homeownership Opportunities in 19 Cities (June 6, 2013), http://www.nationalfair
housing.org/Portals/33/NewsReleaseWellsFargoNFHA130606.pdf. Wells Fargo is not the
only bank that has been accused of racial discrimination in the care and marketing of its
REO properties. See REO Complaints and Press Releases, Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance,
Mortgage Giant Fannie Mae Accused of Racial Discrimination in 34 U.S. Metro Areas
(May 13, 2015), http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/REO/tabid/4265/Default.aspx.
232. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen., State Att’ys Gen., Feds Reach $25 Bil-





233. With a short sale, the holder of the mortgage agrees that the borrower can sell the
house to a third party for an agreed upon amount that is less than the outstanding
principal.
234. Press Release, supra note 232; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Just., Fed. Gov’t and
State Att’ys Gen. Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to
Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agree
ment-five-largest [https://perma.cc/TJ77-7CM6].
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face of local crises, and worse yet, can undermine cities’ efforts to help
themselves, for example, by prohibiting localities from enforcing their
anti-predatory lending ordinances. The third and related pattern is that
federal regulators have been willing to insulate commercial enterprises
from state laws designed to protect consumers.
Lastly, and this is not new news, political ideology determines the ex-
tent to which the federal government responds to the exploitation of bor-
rowers. The free market views of many members of Congress, and
President George W. Bush and his Administration allowed predatory and
subprime lenders to proceed unchecked. Congress chose not to enact any
anti-predatory lending bills, implicitly endorsing exploitative lending. The
regulators of national banks were captured by the banks they regulated,
and actually made it possible for banks to peddle unaffordable loans with
impunity. And executive branch agencies like HUD, FTC, and DOJ were
beholden to George W. Bush’s “hands-off” approach to consumer
protection.
No laws, regulations, or lawsuits have changed the reality for cities:
they are unable to protect themselves or their residents when abusive
lenders sweep into town. They cannot rely on state and federal govern-
ments to help or protect them. And, they must internalize any externali-
ties that lenders impose on them.
It is a crisis of governance when no government entity is both willing
and able to protect people from corporate wrongdoing. When governance
fails, change is needed. In this section of the paper, I lay out various argu-
ments for why local governments should be given some power to regulate
home mortgage loans. In the subsequent section, I describe models for
expanding cities’ power.
A. LOCAL ORDINANCES
1. Police Power and Real Property
The term police power is a shorthand way of saying that municipalities
have the obligation and the authority to take care of and preserve their
communities. For this reason, local governments provide police and fire
protection, and are responsible for public water, trash disposal, and the
like. Cities also have ordinances designed to reduce the incidence of fires,
crime, and injuries to people in houses. These can include requirements
that homes have smoke detectors and that occupants keep grills a certain
number of feet away from homes. Other provisions restrict the number of
unrelated people who can live in a dwelling. When people build or reno-
vate their homes, they must obtain permits, have the work inspected, use
licensed contractors, and receive certificates of occupancy, all to be sure
the construction is of good quality.
Some regulations are geared at maintaining the housing stock. There
are communities that require regular inspections of the exterior of homes;
those properties not in compliance are issued citations. City codes can
also require point-of-sale inspections. If code violations are detected, sell-
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ers must either correct the defects or place money in escrow for the buy-
ers to make the repairs.235 Local ordinances prohibit nuisances by
mandating that people mow their lawns, and forbidding the storage of
junk, appliances, unregistered cars, and combustible or construction
materials in yards.236 These requirements help maintain the appeal of the
community and the strength of the tax base. If homeowners are not obli-
gated to maintain their homes, they could blight the neighborhood, caus-
ing home values to drop to the detriment of their neighbors and their
communities.
Of all the features in a community, there is nothing as definitively local
as the land and homes that lie within its borders. That is why cities can
exercise their police powers to regulate how people use their property.237
For this reason, I contend that it is consistent with police power to allow
cities to protect against exploitative mortgages that encumber property
and can result in foreclosure and vacancy.
The response to any effort along these lines would undoubtedly be that
city ordinances that influence the terms of mortgage loans would impede
statewide uniformity and impose a burden on commerce. My first re-
sponse borrows from the Supreme Court, which in the 1872 Slaughter-
House Cases stated, “‘private interests must be made subservient to the
general interests of the community.’ This is called the police power.”238 A
more contemporary response is that technological developments in finan-
cial services undercut arguments against local control. Increases in com-
puting power have enabled lenders to develop and offer hundreds of loan
products with an array of moving parts and variable terms. It should not
be difficult for them to develop software that, likewise, accommodates
different regulatory regimes. In fact, lenders that make loans nationally
already take into account differences in state laws governing mortgage
loans.239 Thus, the rationales for limitations on local control— uniformity
and the risk of burdening commerce, have little sway when it comes to
home mortgage loans.
Lenders and states might also argue that local mortgage lending ordi-
nances would interfere with state regulation of lenders. So long as local
ordinances do not require less of lenders than state laws require, there is
little or no risk that local ordinances would impede state regulators. As
Professor Vaubel has stated, “[h]ome rule should rest solidly on further-
ing the goal of protecting municipal power until it is clearly established
235. Joe Goldian, Point of Sale Requirements for Cleveland’s Suburbs, REMAX PROS
(Feb. 16, 2015), http://clevelandhousehunt.com/point-of-sale-requirements-for-clevelands-
suburbs/ [https://perma.cc/TC3V-EZGF].
236. Kenneth Pearlman, Elizabeth Linville, Andrea Phillips & Erin Prosser, Beyond the
Eye of the Beholder Once Again: A New Review of Aesthetic Regulation, 38 URB. LAW.
1119, 1144 (2006).
237. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.
in 1926, localities have been able to use restrict the use of land through zoning ordinances.
272 U.S. 365.
238. 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1872) (quoting Chancellor Kent, 2 Commentaries, 340).
239. For a discussion of this contradiction, see Stahl, supra note 30, at 44-45.
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that its exercise will frustrate the state’s regulatory purpose.”240 At a min-
imum, courts should take into account the locality’s interests and not just
the states and the industries’ interests when reviewing efforts by cities to
limit abusive loan terms.241
2. Lobbyists, PACs and Local Issues
To date, financial services lobbyists and PACs have focused their efforts
on state and federal politicians and governments. If cities are given the
power to regulate home loans, the industry will not be equipped to influ-
ence local ordinances to the same degree they have federal and state laws
and regulators.
In 1999, $300 million in financial services lobbying spurred banking
deregulation.242 Between 1998 and 2008, the financial sector donated
over $1.7 billion to candidates in federal elections and spent $3.3 billion
on registered lobbying activities.243 Individual banks spent as much as
240. George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint upon the Exercise of Mu-
nicipal Power in Home Rule, 24 STETSON L. REV. 417, 432 (1995). Vaubel argues that:
[C]ourts [should] invalidate municipal measures only when both state and
municipal requirements cannot possibly be met or when following municipal
directives would defeat clearly expressed state objectives. Guidelines for
achieving these objectives can be summarized: courts should (1) subject lit-
eral quantitative conflict to careful examination in order to determine the
scope of state prohibitions; (2) prevent literal statutory “permissions” from
being used as a means for manipulating municipal power; (3) limit implica-
tions to those based on fact; (4) accept qualitative conflict as necessary for
the protection of state interests; and (5) require clear evidence of legislative
regulatory purpose as a pre- requisite to determining qualitative conflict.
Id. at 439.
241. This argument was advanced over fifty years ago:
It seems that the purposes of the home-rule provisions could be better car-
ried out if the courts would take note of the policies underlying them. Munic-
ipal government has at least two advantages over state government. A
municipal administration is more responsive to the needs of local citizens,
since it must depend exclusively on these people for re-election.  Second, a
local government is more efficient to the extent that efficiency is increased by
closeness to the scene of operations and accessibility to the criticism and sug-
gestions of the persons governed. Yet no court, in deciding whether the ordi-
nance or statute should prevail, has examined these advantages. Rather, it is
always held to be controlling that the matter regulated will have an effect on
citizens living outside the municipality. Even in those matters most intimately
connected with municipal government, however, there is necessarily some
state- wide effect. A test that looks only to the existence of some state inter-
est as a basis for declaring an ordinance which conflicts with a statute invalid
renders it almost impossible to reach a decision in favor of the ordinance. A
more realistic test would weigh the state’s interest against the advantages of
local autonomy.
Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV. 737, 742
(1959).
242. Lisa Lerer, McCain guru linked to subprime crisis, POLITICO (Mar. 28, 2008), http:
//www.politico.com/story/2008/03/mccain-guru-linked-to-subprime-crisis-009246 [https://per
ma.cc/S7CT-6ZVE].
243. Robert Weissman & James Donahue, Wall Street’s Best Investment: Ten Deregu-
latory Steps to Financial Meltdown, 30 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (2009), http://www.multi
nationalmonitor.org/mm2009/012009/weissman.html [https://perma.cc/VGV3-9HMJ].
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$100 million on federal elections and lobbying during this period.244 In
2010, financial services lobbyists outnumbered members of Congress
5:1.245
Financial firms influence state politicians, too. One lobbying firm spent
$6.3 million over several years to lobby against state anti-predatory lend-
ing laws.246 Mortgage lenders donated millions of dollars to the campaign
of Arnold Schwarzenegger, whose state was home to several notorious
subprime lenders. One of those lenders, Ameriquest Mortgage, contrib-
uted $10.8 million to politicians and industry groups in California to de-
feat proposed anti-predatory lending laws.247
Given these numbers, it is not surprising that economists Sufi and Mian
found that contributions from financial firms played a significant role in
defeating legislation designed to protect borrowers against financial insti-
tutions’ abusive loan products.248 They found that between 2001 and
2006, the mortgage industry significantly increased its campaign contribu-
tions to representatives in districts with a high volume of subprime
loans.249 They also found that “the predictive power of mortgage cam-
paign contributions on a representative’s voting behavior increase[d]
sharply during the subprime mortgage credit expansion,” which “suggests
that the mortgage industry viewed high subprime share representatives as
potential allies in shaping subprime market legislation.”250 Financial insti-
tutions’ largess makes it difficult for state and federal politicians to act
against the industry’s interests.
If cities had the power to place limits on abusive home mortgages, it is
unlikely that the financial services industry could use its money to influ-
ence localities across the country, especially in the face of another
scourge of exploitative loans. To chill local efforts, the industry would
have to funnel money to unseat local pro-consumer elected officials and
replace them with politicians who were sympathetic to the industry.251
244. Id.
245. M.B. Pell & Joe Eaton, Five lobbyists for each member of Congress on financial
reforms, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (May 21, 2010), https://www.publicintegrity.org/
2010/05/21/2670/five-lobbyists-each-member-congress-financial-reforms [https://perma.cc/
JL2E-XCT5].
246. Simpson, supra note 89.
247. Dan Morain, Schwarzenegger raked in subprime lender campaign money, PROTECT
CONSUMER JUSTICE.ORG (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.protectconsumerjustice.org/schwarze
negger-raked-in-subprime-lender-campaign-money-2.html [https://perma.cc/698L-8K6A].
248. Atif Mian, Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, The Political Economy of the Subprime
Mortgage Credit Expansion, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 373, 376 (2013).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 376-77, 393. The authors also found that a “sharp increase in mortgage indus-
try campaign contributions and campaign lobby expenditure coincides with a sharp in-
crease in securitization and mortgage lending to high subprime zip codes that occurs from
2001 to 2006 [citation omitted].” Id. at 388. Between 2002 and 2006, contributions by par-
ticipants in the mortgage industry increased by eighty percent. Contributions by other fi-
nancial institutions increased forty percent. Id.
251. Commentators have raised concerns that wealthy institutions will use their money
to influence local elections through super PACS following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See Paul Blumenthal,
Your State And Local Elections Are Now A Super PAC Playground, HUFFPOST POL. (Oct.
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Given that there are approximately 20,000 cities in the United States,
even the largest institutions do not have sufficient resources to fund
thousands of local electoral campaigns. 252
3. Cities as Laboratories
An advantage of cities regulating mortgage loans is that they can serve
as laboratories. Communities can adopt different approaches and policy-
makers and the public can learn what approaches are effective. Experi-
menting on a small scale is less risky than national or even statewide ef-
forts. If problems arise, local governments can more readily amend their
ordinances.253 Other communities, and maybe even state and federal gov-
ernments will gain information that can inform their laws. Ineffective or
unworkable policies can be rejected, and good ones adopted.254
B. LAWSUITS
1. Localities Can’t Always Count on State or Federal Action
When a problem is localized, state and federal governments may not be
as responsive as they would be to an issue with a wider impact. This could
be because they do not recognize the seriousness of the problem or be-
cause they do not become concerned until a problem is more perva-
sive.255 In large states, where the seats of power can be hundreds of miles
from local problems, the seat of government can be too geographically
removed from the experiences of far-off communities. In contrast, local
governments know what is happening in their towns and will be more
responsive than their equivalents in a state capital. Furthermore, cities
can respond in ways that address the needs of their particular
31, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/2015-elections-super-pac_us_5633d165e4b0
c66bae5c7bbb [https://perma.cc/E6TL-C53Z]; see also Alex Roarty, Super PACs’ Next Tar-
get: Local Elections, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2015/05/super-pacs-next-target-local-elections/435639/ [https://perma.cc/87W8-5QFH].
252. National League of Cities, Number of Municipal Governments & Population Dis-
tribution (undated), http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-
structures/number-of-municipal-governments-and-population-distribution. In this respect,
local control furthers democratic principals and repudiates corporate political influence.
253. Diller, supra note 28, at 1136.
254. See id. (noting that “the dynamic of policy experimentation . . . is the primary
normative justification for home rule.”). Professor Diller also discusses the argument that
increasing the authority of municipal governments supports democratic principles. On a
local level—especially in smaller communities, voters have a greater ability to influence
politicians and policies, and find it easier to contact local representatives than state or
federal representatives. Id. at 1135. See also Bergal, supra note 44 (quoting James Brooks,
City Solutions Director for the National League of Cities, saying, “I think the cities have
the political will and consensus to move when the federal government and the state may be
paralyzed or polarized . . . . City leaders are implementing the things citizens seem to want,
and voters seem to be supportive of all of this”).
255. See Caruso, supra note 63, at 86 (arguing in the context of litigation, “if a city is
prepared to invest the resources and political capital to speak on its residents’ behalf in the
face of a stalemate or opposition at a higher level of government, there seems little justifi-
cation to shutting the courthouse doors to the local perspective.”).
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communities.256
Many of even the most community-oriented state politicians did not
appreciate the experience of localities blighted by bad loans. In fact, the
costs that predatory and subprime lenders imposed on communities were
often invisible to politicians until the financial crisis. This was even truer
for federal representatives and government officials.
2. Resource Limitations at State and Federal Governments
State attorneys general and federal agencies cannot pursue every viola-
tion of laws governing mortgage lending. As a result, they have to select
among countless possible violations, usually focusing on wrongdoing with
the biggest impact in terms of the severity of the harm or the number of
people affected. Cities could help fill the enforcement gap and further the
mission of federal and state attorneys general if they were permitted to
bring lawsuits against lenders to protect their communities from unlawful
loans and to recover for the damages those loans cause the cities them-
selves. There is an added benefit to giving municipalities the power to sue
lenders: the cities have a significant information advantage over state and
federal governments. They understand their communities, the local hous-
ing market, and lenders’ and brokers’ activities in their communities.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
I am not suggesting a global expansion of cities’ powers. Rather, I am
proposing that cities have the power to protect residents and themselves
from mortgage loans that contain terms that create a high risk of default
and foreclosure.
Some of the proposals below will likely increase the cost of credit to
people who live in localities that seek to curtail risky lending. It may be
that people will accept the higher cost of credit in order to preserve the
value of their homes and the vitality of their neighborhoods.
A. CURTAILING LOANS LIKELY TO RESULT IN FORECLOSURE
1. Amending UDAP Laws
Professor Kathleen Morris has proposed amending state UDAP stat-
utes to give cities with populations over 50,000 standing to enforce con-
sumer protection laws.257 Ideally, the state statutes would obviate the
need to demonstrate standing, including injury.258 Because some UDAP
256. See id. at 94 (noting that “[w]here a particular issue is important and controversial
enough to deadlock state or federal governments, cities can be nimbler, and may bear
uniquely local burdens which push them to try innovative responses.”); see also Lind, supra
note 139.
257. HOW CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF POPU-
LATION FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 161, at 189,
203; Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, supra
note 70, at 1908.
258. Article III requirements would apply in federal court.
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laws only cover goods and services, legislators would have to expand their
coverage to include transactions involving real estate.
Professor Morris has also proposed amending the FTC Act to allow
claims by municipalities.259 While there is no indication in the legislative
history or the statutory language that Congress ever intended the FTC
Act to provide private rights of action, members of Congress have peri-
odically entertained proposals to expand the entities that can sue under
the Act.260 For example, in 1977, the House considered legislation261 to,
among other things, “provide for private rights of action based on viola-
tions of Commission rules.”262 The Chairman of the FTC supported the
legislation, stating during Committee hearings that:
[T]here is no way that the Commission will be able to file an action
against every person who violates the rules that the Commission has
adopted or is contemplating. Private suits could permit the Commis-
sion to focus its resources on other problem areas where individual
injury does not provide an incentive to seek relief.263
Thus far, Congress “has not seen fit to alter the statutory plan established
in 1938.”264
As an alternative to legislatively expanding the entities that can bring
claims under the FTC Act, Professor Morris suggests that the federal gov-
ernment contract with cities to enforce the FTC Act, which the govern-
ment has done with enforcement of immigration laws.265 I endorse
Professor Morris’s proposals, but would not restrict the size of the cities
that could bring claims. Small localities might be targeted for abusive
loans if a high concentration of people of color live there—a pattern we
have already experienced. Also, limiting the size of the localities that can
bring claims privileges urban areas over rural areas, both of which are
deserving of protection.
I would also expand on Professor Morris’s approach to permit cities to
bring claims under the Dodd-Frank Act, the consumer protection statutes
it amended, and the many state anti-predatory lending laws. These laws
more directly address specific features of loans that have been used to
exploit borrowers.
2. Ordinances Under Zoning Authority
Cities’ zoning authority might be a vehicle for curtailing risky loans.
Municipalities have successfully employed their zoning authority to re-
strict payday lenders. The same approach might work with predatory
259. Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws,
supra note 70, at 1916-17.
260. See S. 1823, H.R. 1078, 5368, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
261. H.R. REP. 3816, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
262. H.R REP. No. 95-339, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977).
263. Id. at 15.
264. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 989, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
265. Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws,
supra note 70, at 1916.
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lenders. For example, a city could adopt an ordinance stating that no
property can be encumbered by mortgage loans with specific, prohibited
terms. Cities already impose restrictions on how land can be used, for
example prohibiting commercial establishments in residential areas or
limiting the location of mobile homes.
3. Home Rule Authority to Regulate Lending
The most dramatic move would be for states to explicitly grant munici-
palities the power to regulate loans secured by real property. State and
federal laws would have to serve as floors. In other words, cities could not
adopt ordinances that reduced the burdens below those imposed by state
and federal laws.
It is not unusual for states to make explicit grants of authority to locali-
ties to prevent blight. New Jersey, for example, recently passed a law pro-
viding that “the governing body of any municipality may adopt
ordinances to regulate the care, maintenance, security, and upkeep of the
exterior of vacant and abandoned residential properties on which a sum-
mons and complaint in an action to foreclose has been filed.”266
4. Mechanisms to Encourage More Responsive State and Federal
Governments
It might be possible to adopt procedural rules that would enable mu-
nicipalities to seek injunctions against lenders who are making risky loans
only after formally requesting that state and federal governments take
action on behalf of the localities. The state and federal governments
would evaluate cities’ requests and determine whether to proceed – a
procedure that could be akin to a qui tam proceeding. If neither govern-
ment authority elected to pursue the case, they could delegate to the city
their authority under the relevant law. Cities would not be allowed to file
a lawsuit until they completed this process.
B. SOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS BLIGHT: TAXING AUTHORITY
1. Real Estate Taxes
The proposals I have discussed thus far focus on ex ante solutions. Cit-
ies also need help when home loans result in foreclosure. One avenue
would be for cities to use their authority to tax real estate to impose an
“impact tax” whenever lenders or other institutions foreclose on prop-
erty. The tax proceeds would go into a fund that cities could use to cover
the cost of externalities that foreclosures impose.
2. Federal Policies to Reduce Blight
On the federal level, the agencies that sell homes that the government
has foreclosed upon should require that purchasers bring houses up to
266. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2.12s (West 2016).
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code within a specified time frame. The same obligation should apply
when purchasers of home loans owned or guaranteed by the government
foreclose on property. Lastly, the FHFA and HUD need to reverse
course. Instead of permitting the agencies to sell mortgage loans and
houses to large for-profit entities, Congress should require them to man-
age the sale of the loans and properties in a way that strengthens rather
than decimates communities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has not fully recovered from the financial crisis. In
some parts of the country, housing prices are depressed to well below
their levels before the subprime boom, and communities are still contend-
ing with vacant homes and blight. The housing market in most parts of
the country is flush with homes but short on purchasers. One would ex-
pect that people would flock to communities where the inventory of
homes for sale is high. That has happened. Banks are cautious about
making loans to people with less than pristine credit histories, in part be-
cause of provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act. Private securitizations of
home loans are few. And, homes that have been neglected for years are
invariably riddled with problems that scare potential purchasers away.
Despite the lingering effects of the crisis, lenders are beginning to in-
troduce new loan products that are available to people with blemished
credit histories, or limited resources for down payments. The financial
services industry is innovative and we should expect the emergence of
more home mortgage products that do not fit the conventional mold.
Some of these products will enable people to obtain homes and sustain
homeownership. Others will create risks to borrowers and their commu-
nities. To borrow from Camus, a virus “never dies or disappears for good
. . . it can lie dormant for years and years and then for the bane and
enlightenment of men, rouse up its rats again.”267 We need to explore
expanding cities’ powers to regulate mortgages while the virus is
dormant.
267. ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 308 (Vintage Books N.Y., 2012).
